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Abstract
Conflict scholarship has developed a complex understanding of how socio-economic fac-tors influence the individual choice to join a rebel group, but conflict scholarship alsolacks progress an understanding of how an individual’s predispositions toward specificbehaviors influence this decision. This dissertation investigates which individual predis-positions are likely to influence the decision to join a rebel group. In examining thesepredispositions, I seek to also answer whether the same predispositions are likely toinfluence the behavior or rebel group members. While the behavioral predispositions arelikely to be numerous, I focus on variation in personality traits and specifically on anindividual’s level of trait aggression. I argue that personality traits are stable predictorsof behavior and likely to influence joining behavior by placing personality trait variationin the broader context of the decision to join a rebel group. I find that variation in traitaggression plays an important role in the individual decision to join a rebel group andthat trait aggression also influences the way individuals perform in a commonly used ra-tional choice game. Finally, I argue that studying personality traits is important outsidethe civil war context and find that aggression also predicts which individuals are likelyto join a traditional state military. The theoretical and empirical contributions of thisproject show that conflict participation models that take individual differences seriouslybetter represent the decision making process.
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Chapter 1Introduction
Consider the following hypothetical example. Abdoul, Bouba, and Farag are friends livingin Benghazi, Libya in early February 2011. Abdoul, Bouba, and Farag grew up togetherin the same neighborhood and today, they are all in their early 20s and each is marriedwith children. They come from the same economic class and ethnic group, and share thesame religious beliefs. Along with their childhood connections, they are neighbors andbusiness partners, dividing their profits equally. Abdoul, Bouba and Farag all disapproveof Muammar Gaddafi’s government, and strongly believe he should be replaced. Theyalso believe that the Libyan people have a right to decide their country’s leadership andstrongly support transitioning to a more democratic form of government.
Abdoul, Bouba and Farag are just three individuals among many in Benghazi who holdthese beliefs, which formed the foundation of the recent revolution in Libya. Despite theirshared beliefs, at the beginning of the movement, when protests were just beginning toswell, Abdoul and Bouba decided to join the demonstrations near their neighborhood andFarag decided to remain on the sidelines. Then, after a few more days of protests, themovement transitioned from peaceful demonstrations to violent clashes between Gaddafiloyalists and the burgeoning rebellion. These clashes resulted in deaths on both sides.As the violence began, Abdoul decided to return to his family, joining his friend Farag onthe sidelines, while Bouba engaged in the violence and continued to fight for the awak-ening rebellion. Why did the three friends participate differently in the rebellion whenthey all faced the same social and economic pressures to participate and they all held
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the same beliefs about the rebellion’s goal?
Despite all of the characteristics these individuals have in common, there are marked dif-ferences in their behavior when it comes to joining the rebellion. Like all human behaviorsthe decision to participate in political protest and rebellion comes from a confluence ofexternal circumstances and events and an individual’s internal behavioral dispositions.The above story is a simple story and one that is hardly representative of the decisionprocess that individuals use when choosing to join a rebellion, yet this story can perhapsillustrate something about that decision process and civil-war scholarship. If we attemptto apply the current leading models of rebellion participation to the story, we would notend up with an explanation of why Abdoul, Bouba and Farag all made different choices.Instead we might end up with a story of why their wealthier neighbors or their neighborsof a different ethnicity (or religion) made a different choice, but the prominent models incurrent civil-war research would explain little about the different choices between Ab-doul, Bouba, and Farag. This is because the models do a solid job of explaining howthe external circumstances and events effect an individual’s propensity to participate in arebellion, but offer nothing about the internal variations affect an individual’s propensityto participate.
In this dissertation, I explore the possibility that individual differences in psychologicalpredispositions toward certain actions, like the violent acts of rebel group members, mat-ter in determining which individuals join rebel groups. We all know people who wouldseemingly be better suited to serve in a rebel group. Perhaps they are more aggressivein everyday activities or enjoy risky actions – i.e. the Boubas of the population. And weall know people who would seemingly be ill-suited to serve in a rebel group. Perhapsthey are more timid in their daily interactions and avoid risk whenever possible – i.e.the Farags of the world. Yet, despite the intuition that psychological differences explain
2
behavior, efforts to use psychology as an explanation of which individuals participate inrebellions is almost non-existent in the literature. Instead explanations focus on ethnicity,religion, education, social environment, age, or wealth. While these certainly influencewho participates and who doesn’t, it is also clear they provide an incomplete story. Amore comprehensive understanding of participation in rebellion requires attention to theinternal variation provided by psychology.
1.1 Research Question
At the most fundamental level, the question motivating this dissertation is: why do somepeople become rebels while others do not? We know that not everyone who witnessesinjustices, hears a rousing speech, or suffers repression chooses to rebel, yet we alsoknow that some individuals do. Furthermore, we know that among all the individuals whothink rebellion is a good idea only a subset of them will engage in violent behavior. In thefollowing chapters, I investigate which individuals are more likely to become rebels andwhy. I explain what makes them systematically different from the rest of the populationand why those differences matter for participating in a rebellion. In essence, this project isa first step in answering a foundational question in the study of civil war – who are rebels?
This project is designed to show how the different behaviors of individuals like Abdoul,Bouba, and Farag can be explained through psychological differences at the individuallevel. The starting point of the project, however, was not psychology. Instead the seedsof this project began while reading and watching news coverage of the Arab Spring. Thenews stories detailed participation in the Egyptian revolution that displaced PresidentMubarak. These stories explained who was protesting by offering socio-economic char-acteristics of what was probably the average protester (i.e. young, male, college student,
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etc.). But surely not everyone who fits in these categories was protesting, especiallyconsidering the relatively large population of Egypt (roughly 82 million people).1 There-fore, what the news was actually reporting was which social groups were mostly likelyto participate and not which individuals within those groups were participating. WhileEgypt was involved in a protest movement, my interest lies in the more violent collectiveaction of rebellion. Over the next few days, I began thinking about the disconnection onthe news and reading about who participated in rebellions and what determined their de-cisions to rebel. When I arrived at the academic literature, I found the traditional conflict-participation theories explained, again, which socio-economic classes participated but notwhich individuals. I, therefore, turned to the theories and literature on political participa-tion from American politics for explanations of individual-level participation and thoughtabout how to apply this research to the study of rebellion.
Drawing on the political participation literature, the goal of this dissertation is not simplyto add another independent variable to already crowded models of rebel participation atthe group level, but instead to develop a theoretical basis for explaining the variation inindividual-level participation – something we observe during all rebellions. Furthermore,I seek to demonstrate in subsequent chapters that psychological variation in individualsrepresents a important factor in determining participation and that this variation is im-portant for understanding rebellion participation and rebel behavior.
Building directly on previous work in political participation, psychology, and rebel-focused conflict studies, the argument presented in the subsequent chapters posits thatindividuals with particular personality traits will be more likely to join a violent politicalmovement, and that those individuals will exhibit systematically different behaviors during
1In fact, only a fraction of the population usually joins rebellions and even less so when events turnviolent. For example, before the Syrian Civil War in 2011 there were roughly six million fighting age (15-50)men in Syria and less than 1% (approximately 30,000) joined any of the initial fighting forces (CIA WorldFact Book 2010).
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and after a conflict. In doing so, I address two related questions: 1) Which psychologicaltraits influence an individual’s decision to join a rebel movement?: and 2) Do the individ-uals who have those traits behave in systematically different ways than those who do not?
Question 1 directly stems from a larger research agenda that goes beyond this disser-tation. Therefore, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this dissertation provide a first glimpse to theanswer by examining only one personality trait – aggression. Simply put, the theory andanalysis below only begin to address the question of who are rebels, but they also providea systematic and reproducible approach that I plan on using in future projects. Question2, however, is intended to clarify why the answer to Question 1 is important for civil-warscholarship and the answer (in Chapter 4) experimentally shows that understanding moreabout the individuals who choose to join rebellion movements can also inform researchon rebel behavior and relevant policy.
1.2 Preview of the Argument
If we asked people to explain the differences in behavior among their friends and rela-tives, they would begin with the obvious features such as age, race, gender, and education.They would then quickly move past such obvious differences and begin referencing ba-sic psychological dispositions as a way to explain their behavior. For example, from theabove story, family and friends might note that Farag is smart and sensible while Boubais a free spirt and adventure seeker. This categorization of pre-behavior dispositionstoward certain decisions helps us understand why people make the choices we observe.In addition, we use this information to predict their behavior in future similar situations.In predicting whether each would take a summer trip for example, we could say Boubais more likely to travel on a whim, while Farag is likely to plan carefully beforehand and
5
consider costs. The exact same logic can also be applied to understanding why Boubajoined the rebellion and Farag stayed home.
Understanding the relationship between basic behavioral dispositions and observed ac-tions is intuitive and part of everyone’s daily interactions with others, but categorizingthese dispositions and empirically measuring their predictive abilities is also part of a rig-orous research program in psychology. This research program is vast but Funder (2008)presents this logic with a particular clarity: “What people do depends both on who theyare – their dispositions such as personality traits – and the situation they are in” (568).The conflict literature has a good grasp on the latter, but knows little about the former. Insubsequent chapters, I argue that basic dispositions, specifically those that tend towardaggressive acts, can be used to increase our knowledge about which individuals join arebel group and explain their observed behaviors (such as, for instance, their behaviorduring reintegration programs).2 It is also important to note, however, that civil warshave two or more sides – often scholars call these ’rebel’ and ’government’ – and that myanalysis only explains the behavior of individuals who join rebellions, although Chapter5 does briefly examine personality and enlistment in the U.S. military.
1.3 Contribution of the Dissertation
The problem with understanding which people rebel is nearly identical to understandingthe general collective-action problem and to understanding which people participate inother political processes (i.e. voting, protesting, and campaigning). Outside of conflictstudies, research has explored political participation for decades and the decision to par-ticipate in politics is, perhaps, the most studied behavior in political science. The focus
2The structure of this section is similar to that in Mondak et al. (2010) which outlines a framework forstudying personality and political behavior.
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of this literature comes from Downs (1957) and the “paradox of turnout”.3 This paradox,has consumed whole swaths of research agendas and graduate syllabi addressing theindividual participation question – similar to Lichbach’s Rebel’s Dilemma (1995) on therebel participation side of things. These studies generally begin with the puzzle of: why,in societies without compulsory participation, do people vote or join political groups? Un-doubtably voting and rebel joining are distinctly different decisions, but each also containsa similar decision structure. Therefore, this literature is relevant to studying rebellionbecause both contain a similar “free-rider” problem that directs a rational person shouldneither vote or join a rebel group. The benefits of the outcome of both decisions are sharedover the whole group irrespective of participation in the process. The cost, however, areborne by only those who participate.4 Despite this, we witness both large amounts ofvoting and substantial joining of rebel groups. In order to account for this inconsistencythe political participation research has shifted toward explaining the participation para-dox with explanations that focus on different types of actors, especially those who receivesome sort of psychological benefits from participation (Hirschman, 1982; Dennis, 1991;Mondak, 2010; Dawes & Fowler, 2009; Fowler, 2006; Fowler, Loewen, Settle & Dawes,2011; Jankowski, 2007; Dawes, Loewen & Fowler, 2011). In the rebel participation litera-ture, however, that shift has not yet occurred.
Of particular relevance to my dissertation are the books by Hirschman (1982) and Dennis(1991). In these two books the respective authors argue that participants in collective ac-tion movements receive “expressive” benefits. These are the benefits participants receivebecause they enjoy some of the actions undertaken during participating. Hischman evenmakes the case that the costs normally attributed to participation should be regarded as
3See Blais (2006) for a good summary of this research.4There are differences between the two decisions in regards to the marginal benefits that one personreceives for participating. This is primarily the focus of Lichbach (1995) as individual rebels could benefitfrom participation in a more substantial way than voters. Several studies, Weinstein (2007) being themost relevant, have shown, however, that benefits from participation are relatively small and rare for therank-and-file members.
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benefits for a subset of people. The main contention of both books is that the motivationbehind political activism lies in the special nature of the cost-benefit calculus of thosewho participate. While it is difficult to fully argue that rebel group participation has suchwell-defined expressive benefits, it is consistent with my argument that some individualsview the cost of participation as, at least partially, beneficial.
Hirschman (1982) equated taking a free ride when the opportunity to participate exists todeclining a delicious meal in favor of a satiation-producing pill. The desire to participatein a burgeoning rebellion on the part of those in Libya and Egypt is obviously inconsis-tent with arguments that people have to be enticed to participate like Lichbach (1995)and others contend. How and why that participation desire varies across individuals,however, is still unclear. This dissertation is an initial move to clarify that variation. Thespecific contributions to the collective study of conflict and to those practitioners who areinterested in preventing rebellions or ending civil conflicts are detailed in the next fewsections.
1.3.1 Rational Choice Modelers
This dissertation is part of a much larger debate about whether human decisions reflectrational-choice models. This debate ranges from individuals making rational choices toorganizations as large as states making rational choices. Among many others the de-bate has been applied to rebellion by Tullock (1971), Muller & Opp (1986), and Opp (1989).
My intent here is not, however, to offer a counter to rational-choice models of rebel join-ing or to make an argument that joining a rebellion is a non-rational act. Instead whatthe remaining chapters show is that the decision to fight or not is inconsistent acrossindividuals with similar or even identical social profiles and that personality traits par-tially explain why some individuals join rebellions. This does not, however, invalidate
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rational choice models of participation. Instead, it deepens the understanding of how theindividual decision to join a rebellion works and could be used in subsequent work tomake the rational choice models more precise or, perhaps, even to allow rational-choicemodelers the ability to make predictions about participation that are empirically testablein a laboratory or field setting. If we have the ability to test the cost/benefit calculationsthat explain rebel joining using well-designed and falsifiable empirical science, insteadof simply assuming that all people make such calculations identically, we should use itto sharpen our models. This dissertation provides a step toward that goal. Rosen (2004)offers a similar argument to this on pages 13-17. His argument, however, is largely basedon how a single individual may make different decisions given the same situation andvarying cognitive functions. My argument differs in that I am less concerned with a singleindividual’s decisions based on cognition and more focused on how two socially similarindividuals will make different decisions based on personality variation.
Psychological, biological, and sociological sciences offer students of conflict an insightinto the human decision-making process that economic rationality does not, but that un-derstanding is largely absent from models on rebel participation. This dissertation beginsto bring those insights into the research on rebellions.
The study of civil war has expended considerable time and effort on both the applicationof rational-choice models to rebellion formation and to understanding the complex socialstructures of pre-rebellion societies. Each of these two different, but linked, areas ofresearch are generally discussed as different influences on how rebel-joining decisionsare made, but this dichotomy is false. Rational-choice models lack a full account of thesource of preference variation, and sociological (or communal) explorations lack an under-standing of the individual decision-making process. While none of the theories of rebelparticipation are wrong, none of them are completely correct either. Rationality exists
9
and potential rebels are rational actors, but rationality does not exist in the way rational-choice scholars often argue it does. Group socialization also exists but it does not fullyexplain individual rebel participation. Instead, the source of preferences in rational-choicemodels are some combination of socialization and biology. Socialization is addressed intheories of rebel participation but biology is not. Understanding the preferences in ourmodels of participation or, more correctly, the variation in the biological source of thosepreference, is a key component to building a more thorough and accurate understandingof who is likely to actively participate in civil wars.
1.3.2 Social Accounts of Participation
Some important models of rebellion participation assume that individual differences domatter, without fully explaining how or why (see Weinstein (2007) for the best example).Other modes of rebellion participation assume that individuals are all the same or atleast that individual tendencies are non-paramount to the discussion. For example, in awell-known and highly regarded article, Omar McDoom (2013) attempts to discover whichindividuals participated in the Rwandan Genocide and what determined that participa-tion. In the article he shows that there is a highly consistent spatial relationship betweenthose who participated in the genocide and those who did not. This finding comes fromdata that show participators were highly likely to come from the same households, neigh-borhoods, and towns. This leads McDoom to conclude that the process of participationis rooted in the social networks of preferences and ideology. McDoom is not the first toargue that a social process explains rebel participation. Cornell & Hartmann (2006), forexample, argue that the “thickness” or “thinness” of a social identity relates to participa-tion and Horowitz (1985) places participation firmly on the foot of ethnic socialization.
McDoom (2013) is correct, although only partially so. He argues that, “assuming that
10
preferences to participate in violence are not genetically transmitted but socially ac-quired, prolonged and regular contact with family members may influence the formationof shared preferences, attitudes, and beliefs” (p.12). This contention is reasonable givenhis results, but the most recent findings from evolutionary biology also show high levelsof heritability in violent and aggressive tendencies (Blonigen & Krueger, 2007, Farring-ton, 2007, McDermott et. al., 2007, McDermott et. al., 2009).5 What McDoom does notconsider is that part of his spatial relationship is probably driven by the heritability ofthe underlying genetically-driven personality traits. This is particularly true given theRwandan tradition of keeping their land holdings within the family through both inher-itance and gifting. Rwandan fathers generally gift a portion of their land to their sonsupon marriage with the new family, usually constructing a home quite close to the ex-isting dwellings (De Lame 1996). McDoom’s misappropriation of his findings is a goodexample of why understanding the internal sources of preferences toward violence andaggression is important for studying collective violence. McDoom’s methodology andmodels are thoroughly researched and comprehensive, but his interpretation of resultsare skewed toward a non-biological conclusion because general conflict-studies lack adetailed understanding of preference formation, which is often driven by biological vari-ation in propensities toward attitudes and behaviors.
To paraphrase Kuklinski, Quirk et al. (2000), we live in a complex world that does notresemble the one in which we evolved, and scholars should consider how modern lifeinteracts with a mindset that was created for once-common tasks that no longer resem-ble tasks of today. Civil-war scholars have spent the past 50 years understanding howthe structure of social cleavages and political institutions constrain and incentivize thechoices of civil-war actors, but it is now time to recognize that humans are constrainedinternally as well (Fowler et al., 2011). The argument presented in Chapter 2 and the
5Heritability is discussed in detail in Chapter 2 but briefly stated, heritability is the idea that a trait(behaviorial or not) is, at least partially, transmissible from parent to offspring.
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results for Chapters 3, 4 and 5 offer a first step in adding the internal constraints ofindividuals to our models of rebel participation.
1.3.3 Conflict Management and Reintegration
Understanding more about the different cognitive processes leading individuals to join ornot join a rebellion may enable us to better predict when rebellions will happen and bet-ter facilitate the movement toward lasting peace when they do happen. We often envisionrebellions as a cascading movement that grows in size and capacity until a governmentresponse or a particular catalytic incident sparks violence. This view of rebellions maybe true but there are often periods of negotiation or talks between parties that attemptto facilitate peace. Sometimes these negotiations are successful and sometimes theyare not. As we know from Sawyer & Guetzkow (1965), Sawyer (1966), Hopmann (1996)and several other negotiation scholars, the success or failure of negotiations is, at leastpartially, dependent on the characteristics of the individual sitting at the table. If theprocess of joining or leaving a rebellion systematically selects certain types of individu-als, then knowing which types of individuals join rebellions could also provide significantinformation about the conflict management process before, during, and after conflict.
In addition, obtaining lasting peace is difficult following intense civil conflict, and weempirically observe reintegration programs failing at a very high rate. Even after nego-tiations have been successful the continuation of conflict by small groups of remainingrebels is commonplace in the post-war environment. This remaining subset of fightersare often assigned titles such as ‘hardliner’ or ‘true believer’ by the media or ‘spoilers’ inacademic circles (Nilsson, 2008). Understanding a bit more about the psychology of theindividuals who make up rebel groups and the subsequent group dynamics can offer novelexplanations of why certain individuals refuse to accept ceasefires or renege on peace
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agreements made during negotiations. This project illuminates more about the decision-making process of rebels and about the personality traits of those who join. Using thesefindings to design future research will hopefully also illuminate more about the processof abandoning rebellions and returning to peace. If, as I illustrate in Chapter 4, the traitsof individuals who join rebellions also predict characteristics of their negotiation styles,then offers made during actual conflict negotiations could be tailored to account for thelikely characteristics of the rebels at the table. Therefore, aiding in rebel reintergrationduring the post-war phase of conflict.
Ending conflicts, especially civil wars, is more difficult than preventing war. BarbaraWalter (2002, Ch.1), for example, argues that successful resolutions in civil wars must un-dergo a three-step process: 1) initiate negotiations, 2) reach a compromised agreement,and 3) implement the terms of the agreement. Personality variation probably plays animportant role in each of these stages but an initial examination of which personalitytraits are present in civil-war combatants is first necessary. This dissertation is a steptowards filling that need.
There are several reasons why ending a civil war is laborious, but implementing the agree-ment is paramount because implementation is a necessary precursor to peace. Walter’s(2002) third stage, however, depends on convincing combatants, through the carrot or thestick, that compromise and demobilization is in their best interest. These carrots andsticks can be presented in many forms – such as deterrence efforts, military and gov-ernment restructuring efforts, truth commissions and tribunals, and, in some instances,side payments or economic incentives offered by third parties. Each of these approachesdepends on the assumption that manipulating the cost and benefits of the offers will affectthe actors’ willingness to accept or reject reintergration.
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These assumptions are generally implicit and untested in the academic literature, how-ever, and it is often unclear whether success or failure of reintergration programs is aresult of the offered carrots and sticks. For example, the model of reintergration througheconomic incentives relies on the degree to which combantants value economic goods.Reintergration advocates implicitly assume that peace will result from giving the combat-ants a profitable alternative to conflict. Further, they assume that coercing combatantsto stop fighting through payments will work much in the same way coercing any behaviorthrough economic incentives does. I do not know the validity of these assumptions, nordoes anyone else, but empirically testing the validity begins with a more basic under-standing of the actors’ preference variation on simple cost-benefit calculations. Perhapsbecause of a lack of understanding about preference formation, there have been relativelyfew empirical tests of how people make cost-benefit assessments in situations mirroringthose that happen during the reintergration process and even less linking those teststo characteristics found in populations of actual rebel fighters. Some of the few studiesthat do exist are found on the international side of conflict studies (McDermott, Fowler& Smirnov, 2008; McDermott, Johnson, Cowden & Rosen, 2007; McDermott et al., 2007;Tingley & Wang, 2010; Tingley & Walter, 2011).
We do know, however, that peace is often not achieved because combatants harbor adesire for revenge or a mistrust of their enemy – which interferes with the process (Sted-man, 1997; Nilsson, 2008). In addition, we know that distrust can reduce the effectivenessof rebel reintegration efforts (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005; Kydd & Walter, 2006). Chap-ter 4 below specifically outlines how trait aggression (found to be present in rebels inChapter 3) affects the way an individual weighs the economic cost and benefits duringan experiment. This directly relates high rates of failure in Walter’s stage 3 and stronglyindicates how personality research can be relevant to both understanding and improvingthe process of reintergration.
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1.3.4 Policy Implications
The application of psychology to conflict studies need not stop at the scholarly researchdoor. It has important implications for policy and practitioners as well and it is easy toimagine the potential benefits of understanding the motivations of individuals who joinrebellions. Rational choice and economic theories currently carry the greatest influencein policy circles, but that does not have to be the case. Rational choice and economictheories of rebel-joining assume that people will maximize their self-interest, when it isnow clear from an abundance of new research that this is not always, and even rarely,the case. People often vary in their ability to endure cost or desire to obtain benefits.Therefore, one of the policy implications of this dissertation lies in its ability to helpidentify those individuals within a society whose specific personalities place them at ahigher tendency to actively engage in rebellion. In addition, it is easy to imagine thepotential benefits of a personality-enhanced theory of rebel-group joining. Personality-trait research is sufficiently well-defined to use in conflict studies and becomes more soby the day. Understanding the personality of rebel-group members can generate moreprecise and more general inferences into how rebels and rebel groups think and act.
My argument also has the potential to inform policy by identifying potential rebels beforeviolence takes place.6 In doing so this project offers information that policymakers can useto develop strategies that help lower the frequency or intensity of civil conflict on threefronts – which are briefly mentioned here and discussed in detail in Section 6.4. First, byfocusing on individual differences in psychology, we can obtain a more accurate pictureof the relative risk of rebellion and develop tests that screen those individuals who aremost susceptible to recruitment by rebel groups. Second, by researching more about thepersonality of individuals who have already joined a rebel group, this project can leadpolicymakers to develop more effective methods of getting individuals to demobilize, and
6Potential ethical concerns of this policy implication are discussed in Chapter 6.
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build more successful strategies to aid mediators during peace negotiations. Understand-ing who are rebels matters because interventions, either pre-rebellion or post-conflict,are more likely to be successful if we have greater knowledge about who the interventionis supposed to be affecting or targeting. Third, if the cognitive biases or other deviationsfrom rationality (addressed in Chapter 4) that push some people toward joining a rebelgroup result from a misinformation or miscalculation problem then they can be addressedwith targeted learning and education programs. If, however, the cognitive biases resultfrom individual differences more deeply rooted in evolutionary differences, then the impli-cations for the prevention or cessation of conflict change. Either way, there are numerouspolicy implications for the use of personality in populations of potential or actual rebelsthat this dissertation begins to unlock.7
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I develop a theorythat addresses the source of these differences (i.e. biology) and defines the differencesmost likely to play an important role in the decision to rebel. Using this argument, Ialso show how and where these differences fit within the larger story of transition froma peaceful society to civil war. In addition, I also review the literature on rebel-groupformation and discuss how my argument adds to the existing scholarship.
Chapter 2’s main argument is based on the theories and findings in the political-participationresearch on American and European politics. The main contention states that personality-trait variation explains, at least partially, why some individuals choose to support a re-
7I would like to note here I that I do not know at this point exactly how the implications change. Itis likely that cognitive biases generated from personality differences are movable but also likely that theprocess is quite different than simply educating someone on the missing information. This is a questionthat I plan to address in future work.
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bellion using violent methods and others support the rebellion using non-violent methods.
In Chapter 3, I specifically examine whether trait aggression predicts volunteering fora rebel group in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This chapter also utilizesa unique research design to account for potential problems in studying psychology in apopulation of former combatants and outlines what those potential problems are for futureresearch. In addition, I test and support a single foundational hypothesis that contentshigher-aggressive individuals are more likely to join a rebel group than lower-aggressiveindividuals.
In Chapter 4, I examine whether trait aggression plays a role in determining variationin a structured economic game using a population of college age subjects at the Univer-sity of Illinois. This chapter is designed to show that those traits (namely aggression),found in Chapter 3 to be present in rebel group volunteers, also affect the way in whichpeople think about cost and benefits relative to their non-aggressive counterparts. Theresults indicate that personality variation can inform both predictions on who joins rebelgroups and how those individuals are likely to behave. The conclusions of this chapterare, therefore, designed to illustate that individual-level personality variation can help usunderstand the behavior of rebels in a manner directly relevant to the existing rationalchoice framework so often used to study rebel behavior.
In Chapter 5, I turn away from studying civil war and rebellion and instead apply the logicto understanding the relationship between individual psychological variation and joininga traditional military force. In this chapter I examine whether personality trait variationalso predicts joining the U.S. military using the familar and extensive Add Health Dataset.
Finally, in Chapter 6, I summarize my findings, review their theoretical and empirical im-
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portance, discuss the role of determinism in this project, examine the ethical concerns ofdeterminism in this project, examine the ethical concerns of this dissertation, and discussplans for future research on psychology and rebellion.
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Chapter 2Theory
2.1 Introduction and Overview
Understanding the psychological factors that drive an individual to join a rebel grouphas important implications for the two fundamental questions of conflict scholars; whydoes war occur? and how do we make it less frequent? ; because psychology can helpfill the links between cause and effect. The way in which people see the world varieswidely, and their perspectives and experiences influence their actions. Exploring thatdecision-making process can help explain rebellion and civil war.
In the past few decades, scholars have created detailed theories and conducted empiricalinvestigations on a range of civil war topics: onset (Gurr,1970; Fearon, 1995; Collier &Hoeﬄer, 1998; Collier & Hoeﬄer, 2002), ethnicity (Ellingsen, 2000; Fearon & Laitin, 2003;Toft, 2003; Hale, 2004), rebel rationality (Lichbach, 1995), reoccurrence (Collier, Hoeﬄer& Rohner, 2009; Mason et al., 2011), and settlement (Mason & Fett, 1996; Walter, 2002;Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). There is, however, a relative lack of research on the actualidentity of individual rebels, why those particular individuals chose to rebel, and howthat affects rebel behavior. The most direct contribution of the theory detailed below isto start answering those unanswered questions.
The existing stream of research on individual rebel participation stems from Mancur Ol-son’s 1965 challenge to theories of rebellion (Olson, 1965). Olson proposed that rebellion
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was too costly a form of participation for individuals to autonomously choose. Therefore,rebellion can only be sustained by means of physical coercion or through select incentivesfor its earliest participants. From this challenge onward, most scholars interested in rebelparticipation framed their work around the collective-action problem and focused on un-derstanding how individuals were coerced or convinced to play an active role in rebellion.
Samuel Popkin was among the first to address this problem through transcripts of inter-views with Vietnam peasants (Popkin, 1979). These transcripts reveal in great detail thatthe primary motivation for joining the rebellion was the potential increase in economicsecurity offered by the rebellion. After Popkin, the most compelling and complete work onrebel participation comes from Mark Lichbach (1985, 1996) who painstakingly inventorieddozens of potential private goods that could be offered as incentives by rebel groups. Healso outlined how potential rebels could rationalize accepting these select incentives ina wide variety of political situations ranging from protest to civil war.
Next, Jeremy Weinstein’s recent work aptly entitled, “Inside Rebellion: The Politics of In-surgent Violence” explains in meticulous detail how four different rebel groups recruitedand controlled members, and conducted successful operations using different selectiveincentives (Weinstein 2007). In his work, Weinstein focuses primarily on how the initialresource allotment available to a burgeoning rebel group largely determines its strategyin recruiting rebels, but he only mentions in passing which individuals choose to join.
These three authors, as well as several others in the field, illustrate how rebel groupsmanage to recruit and retain members without necessarily needing to resort to physicalcoercion or incentives. However, this narrative of how groups entice individuals tells onlypart of the recruitment story.
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For example, consider again the population of potential rebels in Libya in early 2011.Popkin’s work informs us that the forming rebel organization will offer select incentivesto the population to entice participation and overcome Olson’s free-rider dilemma.1 Next,Weinstein’s work tells us that the incentives offered to Benghazi’s residents will be de-termined by the particular material resources available to the rebellion leaders. In thiscase, incentives could include, among others, access to potential oil wealth and politicalpower Finally, Lichbach’s work explains the logic of why it is rational for an individual toaccept these incentives and join the rebellion even though that decision includes mortalrisk. In doing so, Lichbach details the ways in which individuals receive benefits fromparticipation–or suffer cost for non-participation–and how those forces can have a greaterinfluence than the potentially fatal risks associated with participation. As I explained inChapter 1, however, not every person in the population of potential rebels in Eastern Libyawould welcome the incentives offered by rebel leaders and only some actually joined thegroup. Understanding who accepts incentives and joins the group as opposed to thosewho do not is a necessary component for understanding who becomes a rebel and howrebellions work; yet none of the major works on rebel-group participation addresses thisspecific concern.
An important challenge in researching who joins rebel groups is understanding that notonly do external variables such as wealth, ethnicity, religion, and ideology play a role indetermining participation, but also that internal variations such as emotion, personality,and experience constitute an inherent part of the decision to join. The unique psychologyin most, if not all, individuals dictates how they process information and make decisions.Psychological variation, therefore, offers useful information about the ways in which peo-ple reach a decision, and the differences in those decisions.
1In addition to the line of general work on participation in rebellion, several scholars have done selectedcase studies on single conflicts. Among many others, Mason and Krane (1989) and Wood (2003) examinewhy individuals participated in El Salvador, Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) in Greece, Scott (1977) in SoutheastAsia, and Varags (2008) in Columbia’s long-running conflicts.
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The remainder of this chapter is broken into four sections. The first explains why studyingindividuals as well as groups is essential in civil-war research. The second explains whythe individual differences important to rebellion exist in the first place. The third sectionoutlines how these individual differences work collectively together in a general model ofrebellion participation. Finally, the fourth section explains how this theory fits with theother research on rebel participation.
2.2 Why Study Individuals?
One of the most important theoretical and methodological issues in the study of rebellionis whether to use all rebel groups, a single rebel group, the individual rebel, or the actscommitted by the rebel group as the unit of analysis. I do not support one level overanother because I believe each unit of analysis can tell us something about the behaviorof rebel groups. Yet each unit also has important limitations that must be considered. Ofthese potential units, the least studied and least understood is the rebel herself/himself.This is most likely because scholars follow the pathway of least resistance when study-ing rebellion – which is to assume away individual variation. Conflict scholars, unlikeour American Politics colleagues, have traditionally had limited access to the individualsinvolved in rebellions and, therefore, focused instead on collecting data of the observablegroup behavior. A result of this lack of access has been a failure to include the individ-ual level variation created by individual differences in our larger models of rebel groupbehavior.
The use of genetic, neurological, and psychological analyses are just beginning to filterinto civil-conflict research and none of the current theories of rebel-group formation in-
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clude an investigation of individual psychological-trait variations.2 This lack of focus onthe rebel is unfortunate because the complexities of human individual behavior cannot befully understood without exploring all forms of individual variance, including psychologyand neurology (Kendler & Baker, 2007). Research on rebels and rebel groups will be in-complete until it takes into account the psychological foundations of human behavior andhow those foundations vary across individuals and groups.3 Individual preferences towarda plethora of important characteristics of rebellion including violence, justice, inequality,and fairness form the basis for both attitudes and behavior and, therefore, are neces-sary to understanding the observed variation in actions (Hatemi & McDermott 2011). Forexample, the psychological trait classified as “aggression” can vary widely from one indi-vidual to another and has been found to influence an individual’s attitudes and behavioron issues ranging from minor verbal incidents to harmful or even deadly physical attacks.Aggression is one of several personality traits which, when combined, create a subtypeof individuals who possess a heightened sensitivity to unpleasant emotional states and atendency toward disinhibited behavior (Blonigen & Krueger 2007). The following discus-sion and chapters are intended to first explain how this variation works in the decisionto join a rebel group, and then determine if this variation actually exists in rebel-groupmembers.
2.3 Why These Individual Differences Exist
In Chapter 1, I introduced the idea that studying the influence of individual differencescan help us better understand which individuals rebel. In the remaining sections of this
2Interstate conflict and foreign policy analysis has for a long time used psychology to understand warwhich is most notably seen in Jervis (1976) and Levy (1992), although that work has fallen, a bit, out offavor in the past few decades.3In this chapter I use the terms psychological individual differences and personality interchangably,which is explained later in this chapter.
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chapter, I offer an argument on how these individual differences affect an individual’spropensity to rebel, and in subsequent chapters I offer a test of this argument. In myopinion, my argument and the empirical findings presented make a compelling case, butthe story would be incomplete without at least a brief discussion of origins of these indi-vidual differences and why they exist. In addition, understanding the source of variancein individual psychological differences is necessary to avoid potential spurious or reversecausality concerns. If in the next few chapters I demonstrate a correlation between certainpersonality traits and the propensity to join a rebel group, and other behaviors civil-warscholars are concerned with, then I must also offer a reasonable argument that the vari-ance in personality traits is what generates the variance in a joining behavior and notvice-versa. The availability of only cross-sectional survey data and interviews, however,makes it difficult to rule out the possibility of a spurious or reverse causality relationship.Therefore, in this section, I will attempt to make the claims presented in the subsequentchapters more credible by discussing the foundations of individual psychological variationand including the most relevant work on its origins and stability over time.4
All politically relevant behaviors, and probably all behaviors, come from a combination ofexternal and internal factors. As Buss (1991, p. 461) writes,
“All observable behavior is the product of mechanisms residing within theorganism, combined with environmental and organismic inputs that activatethose mechanisms.”
Understanding why some individuals participate in rebellion while others do not is, there-fore, the process of understanding which external (Buss’s environmental) factors and in-ternal factors are relevant to the decision and how those categories of factors interact. Aconsiderable amount of research has explored the external factors of the decision, and Iwill discuss this in greater detail later in this chapter, but no research that I am aware
4This section and the next are largely drawn from Mondak (2010) and Costa Jr & McCrae (1994).
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of has explored the internal factors of the decision to join a rebel group. A substantialamount of research, however, has explored the internal factors of other human decisions,including political ones.
Much of the work on the internal drivers of decisions has focused on the variation ofpersonality traits and the origins of personality. The research on the origins of person-ality has centered in on most traits, and probably all, being formed from a combinationof genetic variation and environmental influences – which is thought to occur early inlife. Generally this type of research has made use of studies that compare differencesin behaviors between Monozygotic (identical) and Dizygotic (fraternal) twins. A com-plete discussion of the logic behind these types of studies is beyond the scope of thisdissertation, but it is important to note that this research design helps us distinguish be-tween genetic influences and environmental influences in observed behavior.5 While theevidence that personality has a strong genetic underpinning is overwhelming, the exactamount of the heritability of personality is difficult to estimate. Most research, however,puts the heritability of personality traits (0-1 scale) at a minimum of 0.40 and with mosttraits being in the 0.60 - 0.70 range (Costa Jr & McCrae, 1994; Bouchard Jr & Loehlin,2001; McCrae & Costa Jr., 2008; Buss, 2009).6 With these positive and reliable results,bio-personality research supports the conclusion that a consistent genetic structure ac-counts for a large portion of the variation in personality. This research is compelling anddoes a solid job demonstrating that variances in personality are produced by variancesin genetics or, stated simply, individual differences in personality are due in large part to
5In addition, it should be noted that the most recent research in this subfield argues that neithergenetic nor environmental influences are completely independent as both exert influence on the individual- particularly early in a person’s life.6Heritability refers to the impact of genes on an observed behavior within a entire population not anindividual. More accurately the statistic refers to the amount of variance between individuals in the trait thatis a direct result of genetic differences and not environmental differences (Boomsma, Busjahn & Peltonen2002). The Heritability statistic ranges from 0 to 1 with larger numbers indicating more heritability and notrait, psychological or physical, is completely heritable. Most genetic researchers consider physical height,which has a heritability of 0.80, as the gold standard which makes the range of personality traits quitecompelling.
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the individual differences in genetics. It matters little for my argument that personality isgenetically based, it does matter greatly, however, that the genetic base of personalityimplies long-term stability.
Genes are stable; we are born with them and while there is growing evidence that theyare expressed at different times and places based on variance in environmental factors,the stability of genes is well-researched and widely known. It logically follows thenthat if personality traits are largely due to genetic variation, and if genes are stable,then personality should also be stable over time (Costa & McCrae, 1998; Rantanen etal., 2007; Bloeser et al., 2015). Several distinct longtitutal studies have investigated thisquestion. For example, Matthews & Desmond (1998) and Caspi (2000) note that there islittle change in personality after adolescence and particularly little following age thirty.Caspi & Silva (1995) report that the personality trait variances measured in three-year-old children and again in those same individuals during adolescence and adulthood has avariance of less than ten percent. This is not to say that a particular individual’s person-ality traits are completely stable over time or over an individual’s entire lifespan. Instead,current research in both biology and psychology argues that the variance between indi-viduals is stable over time even if individual levels change through maturation processes.For example, we know anecdotally and empirically that young people are far more likelyto engage in risky behavior than older individuals, and we know that some young peopleare far more likely to engage in risky behavior compared to others in the same age group.What the research on trait stability tells us, however, is that the same individuals whoare more risk-prone as youths will also be, with a high probability, the same individualswho take more risk as adults (Trimpop 1994). The levels of risky behavior and the cor-responding personality traits may change as we get older but the variance within peergroups does not.
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The final discussion for this section focuses on the primary reason why these individualdifferences exist within the human population: evolution. Evolution is the “fitness-basednonrandom selection of individual differences” (Marsh, Boag & Hicks 2010, 124). In neuro-sciences and psychology, the configurations and functions of tissue structures, both brainand otherwise, and the differences in these structures are explained via an adaptive ap-proach to understanding the conditions under which the structures developed. Personal-ity trait variation and the corresponding brain configurations are part of these structures.7
In political science, the study of personality traits driven by evolutionary forces has alsoexamined the sources of individual differences in cooperative behavior (Cesarini et al.,2009), bargaining, risk, leadership, hierarchy (Hatemi et al., 2009), ideology (Funk et al.,2013), punishment and aggression (McIntyre et al., 2007), and social organization (Eaves& Hatemi, 2008). The evolutionary implications of individual variation that apply to thestudy of rebellion, however, are not present in the literature except for a few isolatedarticles (see McDermott, Fowler & Smirnov, (2008) for the best example). The lack ofevolution-based participation research in the study of rebellion is, at least partially, aresult of accounting for the paradox noted above: why does an individual willingly chooseto participate in an action when the cost of participation may be death? In evolution-ary terms: why would natural-selection tendencies favor a strategy that could end theindividual’s life and, in turn, the ability to reproduce? Rationalists have addressed thisproblem by reconsidering the cost and benefits faced by the individual (discussed ingreater detail in the next two sections). Evolutionary psychologists have addressed thisproblem by realizing that natural selection adopts strategies that favor greater averagesurvival for current and future generations and thus, an individual may have biologicalsystems that favor death as long as the outcome of that death, again on average, produces
7This evolutionary-based model of individual psychological differences is dominant in the field of psy-chology but it also has its critics. For a good example of these critics see Pinker (2005), which argues fora more experience-based understanding of individual differences.
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greater good for the group – therefore, ensuring a higher survival rate of shared geneticmaterial (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990; Tooby & Cosmides, 1995; Tooby & Cosmides, 1998).
For instance, imagine the long-term survival of groups of people with different distri-butions of aggressive personality traits which, according to evolutionary theory, has aprofound effect on the traits selection. When a low level of conflict exists between groupsof early humans, a large number of individuals with a low aggressive personality trait willdo better. This favors a large distribution of the low level aggressive trait. In contrast,when a high level of conflict exists between groups of early humans, a large number ofindividuals with highly aggressive personality traits will do better. This favors a largedistribution of the highly aggressive traits. If, however, the variation in levels of conflictbetween the groups of early humans happens at a much faster rate than the pace of evo-lution, which is quite likely, then neither group will be able to adapt to the changing en-vironments. Instead, there may be a selective advantage to groups with a specific mixtureof high and low aggressive individuals that allows the groups to adapt to changing levelsof intergroup conflict, essentially involving a mixture of individuals who are likely to fightwhen given the opportunity and individuals who are likely to flee when given the oppor-tunity.8 The central part of this story is quite similar to the argument dubbed ‘parochialaltruism’ used to study the cooperativeness toward in-groups and non-cooperativeness to-wards the out-groups in dozens of articles on evolutionary psychology – see Rusch (2014)for a recent summary of this work and Fowler (2006) for an application in political science.
The goal of the above example and of this section is to explain briefly the origin of psy-chological individual differences relating to traits present in rebellions. The origin ofpsychological individual differences, however, matters little for their use in the study of
8This example is similar to the examples for the Darwinitic origins in other personality traits explainedby Buss (1991), which established a set of guiding principles for the study of personality trait variaton.In addition, very similar arguments are made Bowles (2009) and Puurtinen & Mappes (2009) on evolution,warfare, and trait development.
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rebellion – its significance lies simply in understanding that the variations are stable andpresent in all human populations. For individual differences to be important in under-standing who rebels, the only factors necessary are that the differences exist, are stableover time, measurable, and meaningful for predicting the choice to join a rebel group. Theremainder of this chapter discusses those concerns.
2.4 Participation in Rebellion
Many theories of conflict participation help explain the origin of participation in rebellion,but they either predict that everyone in the population or, more correctly, everyone in anactivated sub-population, will eventually participate or that no one will (see Gurr (1970),Tullock (1971), Lichbach (1998), and Weinstein (2007)). In reality, however, a portion ofpotential participants out of the activated sub-population participate, and others do not.Although this may be simply due to a miscalculation of cost and benefits or a problemin understanding the opportunity by those who do not participate, my argument is thatthere are underlying psychological differences between those who participate and thosewho do not. The same people who participate in one rebellion would likely have par-ticipated in another, given similar context, and those individuals who didn’t participateagain likely would not do so. Empirically, this argument has some support in the largerpolitical participation literature as both Fowler (2005) and Hauert et al. (2007) find thatthe individuals in mixed populations who cooperate in one cooperation opportunity arethe same ones who cooperate in another, while the same is true of non-cooperators whotend to not cooperate even when given mulitple opportunities.9
9For an interesting argument on why this mix of cooperators and non-cooperators exists in humanpopulations see Fowler et al. (2011). In this article the authors argue that evolution has produced a stablemixture of individuals with different propensities to feel cost or benefits and, therefore, cooperate as away to provide social groups with the mixture of both cooperators and non-cooperators that best ensuressurvival of the group.
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In addition to the research on general political participation, a compelling body of evi-dence has emerged that suggests personality traits correlate highly with human behaviorsin general. Violent and aggressive behaviors and an attraction to violence are credible ex-amples of these general behaviors (Blonigen & Krueger, 2007). The majority of personalityand violence research has focused on positive relationship between certain personalitytraits and “personality disorders,” such as sociopathy and psychopathy. Even thoughthese are undoubtedly present in some rebel group members, this type of research isunsuitable for understanding the general relationship between personality and violence(Widiger et al., 1994).
Participation in rebellion is neither universal nor consistent. Some people participatewhile others do not. This choice can either be driven by a deliberative process that someindividuals do not or can not undertake, or from the expression of an underlying psy-chological trait that some people have and others do not. Some of the aforementionedresearch on political participation and personality can be extremely useful in helping usunderstand rebellion through identifying the internal individual differences that operatein tandem with the broader social forces, because these internal differences influencewhich individuals become rebels and which individuals do not. Thus, I offer in the nextsection a model of rebel participation that is more complex and, therefore, compellingbecause it bridges the gap between the research on which groups of people rebel andwhich individuals within that group join the rebellion.
By conceiving of the population of potential rebels as divided into different types basedon their personality profiles, we can better understand how different environmental fac-tors draw specific individuals into participating. My argument focuses on the greaterattraction to the actions of rebel groups (violence, aggression, etc.) by some individualsover others. This attraction exists in all similar behaviors, not just rebellion, because their
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specific personality traits predispose them toward attraction toward violent and aggres-sive actions. Or put another way, indivuals who are more attracted to join a rebel groupwould also be more attracked to join any group that contains the potential for violent andaggressive actions.
2.4.1 How Individuals Become Rebels
To examine the question of why some individuals choose to participate in rebel groupsand others do not? I first need to provide a basic model of how rebel groups are formedand the process an individual takes in becoming a member. I need to consider why theshort-term, material interest appeals to some individuals, why others have their ethnic,religious, or ideological identities activated by the appeals of rebel leaders. Finally, Ineed to illustrate how the process of becoming a rebel is affected by both external andinternal forces.10
Figure 2.1 illustrates the basic process of rebel-group formation. The process generallybegins with an exogenous event that can vary widely in form and function. For example,the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011, was either a result of the turmoil created bythe larger Arab Spring movement, a result of the repressive Assad regime, or most likely,a result of the interaction of these two factors.11 Most rebellions begin with an interactionof external and internal forces and rebellion occurs only when some individuals willinglyforgo the mortal risks of challenging the status quo and take up arms. This initial action
10In this section I am discussing the process of becoming a rebel in general terms while also understandingthat specific conflicts may exclude some of the elements I discuss or hightlight others. In a future project,I plan on extending this theory by creating a more nuaunced relationship between recuritment strategies,conflict characteristics and personality trait activation.11This model is obviously a simplification of the Syrian civil war. The actual division in Syria consistedof multiple rebel groups and their supporters and a mirror image on the government support side. Forthe purposes of my argument it makes no difference how many groups exist as long as there is a divisionbetween the government forces and non-government forces.
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is often taken by the future leaders (political or military) of the rebellion and begins theprocess of social division at the group level (indicated in Figure 2.1 as the 1st SelectionProcess).
This first selection process is well understood in the civil-war literature and has been theprimary focus of rebellion initiation research over the past few decades. For example, weknow that the division between rebel-group supporters and government supporters, thefirst selection process in Figure 2.1, often falls on the fault lines of ethnicity (Horowitz1985) or income inequality (Muller, 1985; Lichbach, 1989) which result from grievances(Collier & Hoeﬄer, 2002) created by relative group deprivation (Gurr, 1970). We alsoknow that this process happens at the group level and divides the population into sub-populations based on existing social cleavages.
The second selection process indicated in Figure 2.1 is less understood, although notcompletely without study. How the second selection process begins and why some in-dividuals take up arms is partially addressed in the conflict literature. For example,we know that rebel groups must first overcome the inherent collective-action problem informing a group that carries such a heavy individual cost by providing benefits to (orimposing cost on) individuals that make joining more appealing (Lichbach, 1998). We alsoknow that participants in collective violence often share common social networks and tendto have previous contact with other participants (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008; Mc-Doom, 2013; McDoom, 2014). In addition, Weinstein (2007, 96–126) and Lichbach (1998,217–226) both argue that participation in rebellion encompasses multiple roles with someindividuals becoming sympathizers and only offering moral support to the rebellion. These‘moral’ supporters may speak positively about the rebels in their homes and workplacesbut offer little in the way of material support. Others choose to support the rebellion withmaterial backing – most often via money, food, shelter, or labor. I call these individuals
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Figure 2.1: Rebel Group FormationPopulation
1st Selection Process





‘material supporters’. Both of these types of support are displayed in Figure 2.1. Thesetwo categories, moral and material support, make up the majority of rebel supporters. Thefinal group of rebel supporters choose, however, to offer their support via a more violentmethod as actual rebel fighters. These fighters directly engage in conflict on behalf ofthe rebellion and knowingly choose a method of support that contains violence and ag-gression.12 The specific types of support available for individuals can vary from conflict toconflict, often depending on the resource endowment of the area, but all rebel supportersfall into these three main categories: rebel fighters, material support, and moral support.My argument extends the previous work on rebel group formation by addressing which
12Weinstein (2007) calls these individuals ‘militants’ but I prefer the term fighters because militants canbe misunderstood to include individuals providing logistical support but not actually engaging in combat.
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individuals choose to become rebel fighters instead of material or moral supporters afterthey have already decided to generally support the rebellion.
Understanding which individuals will become rebel fighters and which individuals willnot is largely unstudied in the civil-war literature. The existing theories of rebel groupparticipation do a solid job of parsing down the population of potential fighters into in-creasingly smaller groups: i.e. not the entire population, just the oppressed ethnicity;not the entire ethnic group, just the lower economic classes; and not the entire lowereconomic class, only the males. Yet, little is ultimately known about which particularindividuals within the final subgrouping are likely to join the rebellion because no sys-tematic analysis has ever been performed.
This lack of understanding is evident in the different findings from case studies on rebel-lion and civil conflicts. For example, in the ethnic militias of Nigeria, Guichaoua (2007)finds that, along with ethnicity, above-average education levels, consistent occupation,and high levels of social connectedness best predict whether a person joined one of theavailable groups. Humphreys & Weinstein (2008), however, find that the majority of fight-ers in Sierra Leone (across groups) were uneducated, poor, and generally unemployed(including students). These seemly divergent findings are not surprising given the differ-ing contexts of two drastically different conflicts. Kalyvas and Kocher (2007), in Greece,and Mason and Krane (1989), in El Salvador, both find that rebel joiners tend to comefrom regions where violence against civilians occurred because joining an armed groupbecomes a method to find relatively safety. Another set of studies indicates that ethnicand social identities have been used to reward and sanction free-riders which providesheavy social incentives to participate (Ostrom, 1990; Moore, 1995; Petersen, 2002). Yet,the question of whether there are any consistent joining predictors across all rebel groupsis an empirical question that is left unanswered. Without doubt the decision to join a
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rebel group is a function of both external factors including conflict context and socialdemographic characteristics and internal individual psychological variation. To predictjoining behavior, however, the research must focus on variables that are constant acrossall populations but varying within individuals and turn away from variables that varyacross populations but effect all individuals.
Lichbach, Weinstein and others have the basic structure of rebel participation correct,but their story is incomplete. Knowing how the process works and why some individualschoose to take up arms does not fully answer the question that has preoccupied scholarsof political violence since at least the mid-1960s when Olson (1965) issued his challenge:why do some individuals choose to join costly rebellions while others do not? – addinga focus on theories of behavior that deal with variation between individuals will. Person-ality is just such a variation.
2.4.2 Personality
Personality traits have been a central part of the study of individual differences for morethan 70 years. Yet the study of personality is barely on the radar screen of conflictresearch. It is, however, thriving in the work of behavioralists in American and Comparativepolitics. These scholars seek to explain the same general question as conflict scholars –why individuals and groups of people make specific political decisions – and have turnedto personality as a way to understand why some people participate and others do not.International conflict scholars, including George and Smoke (1974), Jervis (1976, 1992),and Huth, Gelpi and Bennett (1992), have regularly considered individual psychology asa source of variation in the propensity to engage in violent behaviors. Levy (1997, 87), forexample, argues that in prospect theory,
“people tend to evaluate choices with respect to a reference point, overweigh
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losses relative to comparable gains, engage in risk-averse behavior in choicesamong gains but risk-acceptant behavior in choices among losses, and respondto probabilities in a nonlinear manner.”
This quote and logic easily fits into an understanding of personality differences. Beforeexplaining how personality plays a role in the decision to join a rebel group, I will firstdefine the concept of personality and discuss its general role in decision making. Per-sonality is on the surface a seemingly easy concept to define but, after diving deeper,it can become quite complex. To simplify the process, I prefer to think about the con-cept outside the realm of academia. If a random person, who has no knowledge aboutthe academic research on personality, is asked to describe someone’s “personality” shewould most likely give a list of behaviors that he or she exhibits: honesty, caring, nice,easy-going, fun-loving, hot-headed, or quick-tempered to name a few. Psychologists usedifferent words like extraversion, aggression, threat-perception and conscientiousness tomore precisely measure trait structures, but the basic concept of understanding a person’sbehaviors via a list of traits remains the same.
The exact definition of personality varies quite a bit but most psychologists define aperson’s personality somewhere in the realm of ’a set of traits which define a person’sconsistent and expected behavior in most situations’ (Boyle, 2010). Using this definition,we can give the concept a few important characteristics: 1) personality is not absoluteand cannot predict a person’s behavior in every situation; 2) personality can be usedas a tool to understand the variation in behavior between individuals especially in theaggregate; and 3) if personality predicts the way an individual is expected to behave,then personality can be used, post-hoc, to answer the question of why a person behavedin a particular way or why a person joined a rebel group (Mondak, 2010). In essence,personality traits represent a latent construct that can explain why individuals repeat-edly exhibit similar behaviors.
36
The measurement of personality has stimulated much controversy over the past fifty yearsbut the dominant approach used by most psychologists is called the nomothetic model.In this model, personality traits are assumed to moderate situational variables on behav-ior through an information process separate from ability or motivational influences. Inpsychology, the notion that personality traits affect an individual’s behavior in generaland when faced with specific situations is so widely accepted that the current debatesrevolve around measurement and methodology used in research designs and not aroundthe role of personality itself (Boyle, 2010, p.14-17).
The how in the casual chain between personality traits and observed behavior is executedbecause personality traits are believed to filter differing incoming stimuli into preordainedcategories of action. For example, one may simplify the brain into two functions, ‘phys-ical aggression’ and ‘all other responses’, and run an experiment in which two differentindividuals, a high-aggressive trait individual and a low-aggressive trait individual, aregiven ten different identical information stimuli. The high-aggressive trait person wouldbe expected to filter more of the stimuli into the ‘physical aggression’ category while alow-aggressive trait person may filter only a few or none of the stimuli into that category(this process is fully addressed in Chapter 3). Using this model of understanding person-ality, we can conceptualize personality in a very literal sense.
Personality is the group of brain structures through which all incoming information isfiltered (Allport, 1961). As Figure 2.2 illustrates, when all external variables are consis-tent, then personality determines the variation in individual behavior because it directlyaffects the interpretation of the external environment. Personality indicates an individ-ual’s behavioral tendencies in differing environments because it shapes how all externalinformation is processed. Whether the behavior is voting, joining a political campaign,
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attending college, or joining a rebel group, an individual’s personality is a good predictorof his likely behavior, especially in the aggregate and when compared to other people,because, as Figure 2.2 illustrates, personality traits provide variation when external en-vironment does not.






2.4.3 Personality and Joining a Rebel Group
The underlying foundation of this project is that human behavior should be explained byboth internal and external factors. It is critical, therefore, to understand that personalityvariation does not “determine” behavior or have any type of “deterministic” component.Instead, personality provides variation in the basic probability that an individual willhave the neurological inclinations toward the types of actions that rebel groups normallyperform – violence, looting, or just general warfare. Personality has an impact on theprobability of an individual joining a rebel group simply because personality affects allhuman behaviors. For example, individuals clearly differ in their propensity to engagein violent or risky actions and a large portion of this effect has been shown to traceto variation in personality (Blonigen & Krueger, 2007). The effect of personality on the
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probability of an individual joining a rebel group stems from its effect on the individ-ual’s willingness to engage in violent actions, willingness to engage in risky behavior,or reaction to threat. Although the careful operationalization of personality variation isnecessary for applying the concept to conflict, it also remains as critical to the study ofrebellion as it does to study of any human behavior. For example, Figure 2.3 illustratesthat if two randomly drawn individuals from a country with a burgeoning rebellion werecompared and found to have the same external influences on their probability of joiningthe rebellion (i.e. religion, ethnicity, socio-economic status, etc.) then explanation wouldhave to rely on internal differences between them (i.e. personality).
Figure 2.3: Rebel Member Selection
Low AggressionLow Risk TakingIntrovertHigh Conscientious
High AggressionHigh Risk TakingExtravertLow Conscientious
EthnicityReligionEducationStatus
REBEL
To determine which of the individuals illustrated in Figure 2.3 is more likely to rebel, oneimportant element is necessary. We need to first determine which traits are likely to playa major role in the choice to join a rebel group. To accomplish the first task I examined
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the psychology literature on trait definition, trait measurement, and the process of join-ing a rebel group. Rebellion and forming a rebel group are examples of collective actionand, as with all voluntary collective actions, individuals decide whether to participate.13This choice, however, is at the extreme of the collective-action spectrum as participationcomes with both the real potential of mortal risk and a high likelihood of committing actsof violence. Therefore, the personality traits that regulate an individual’s participationin a rebellion are likely those that are attuned to the individual’s perception of risk andacceptance of violence.14 Based on research in psychology, the personality traits mostlikely active in the decision to join a rebel group are 1) aggression (discussed in Chap-ter 3), 2) risk-taking (post-dissertation work), and 3) threat-perception (post-dissertationwork). A full model of the effect of personality on rebellion joining should also include theFive-Factor Model (or Big-5 traits) as it has been shown to account for a large portion ofpersonality in general behaviors (also post-dissertation work). Predicting which membersof an activated sub-population are likely to join a rebel group is a function of all threeof these traits and the Big-5. The reminder of this dissertation, however, will primarilydiscuss aggression and its role in the decision process.
Above I argue that personality traits develop early in life and are remarkably stable.Therefore, personality traits are formed before most potential rebels become exposed tothe context of any given rebellion. As a consequence, the impact of personality on thelikelihood of joining a rebellion must be indirect - that is, personality acts to influence theprobability joining a rebel group by increasing general attitudes toward engaging in vio-lence or taking risky actions, which themselves directly affect the decision to join. Thereis no “rebellious personality” or ”rebellious personality trait” that predicts the probability
13See Lopez (2012, p. 75-85) for a similar argument on the formation of all collective violence groups.14An extension of this argument that I plan on addressing in subsequent research is that, ceteris paribus,as rebel groups grow larger they also become less risky on a per-individual level. This means that theearly joiners are more risk-accepting than later joiners and I would, therefore, expect different levels ordifferent traits in early versus late joiners.
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of joining. Instead there are stable traits that directly affect the acceptance of the type ofbehaviors a potential rebel can logically assume he or she will have to undertake. Fromthis perspective, my argument is that personality traits such as aggression, risk-taking,threat perception and the Big-5 can be construed as the primary but distant variableswhich shape, together with conflict context, the proximal attitudes that predict joiningbehavior.
2.5 Conclusion
The main argument of the theory presented above is that personality traits influence thevariation in who chooses to join rebel groups because they affect propensities towardviolent and aggressive behaviors. Individuals who have higher aggression traits, highrisk-taking propensities, and salient threat-perception traits will be more likely to join arebel group than individuals who do not. I now turn to providing a more direct method ofbehavior determination and empirically evaluating the argument presented here. In thenext chapter, I explore the direct relationship between the personality trait of aggressionand the choice to join a rebel group using data from multiple rebel groups in the GreatLakes Region of Africa. Chapter 4 will explore the relationship between different levelsof aggression and cognition processing styles. In Chapter 5, I diverge from testing rebel-group joining behaviors and test the relationship between personality traits and joiningtraditional state militaries. In each of these chapters, I offer specific testable hypothesesderived from the above discussion and provide supportive evidence.
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Chapter 3Aggression and Rebellion
Violence and aggression often go hand in hand with rebellion. A central element of theeffort to understand rebellion and the effort to prevent and reduce incidences of violenceduring rebellion is to understand the factors that contribute to individual differences inthe propensity to be violent or aggressive. The individual differences in involvement inviolent behaviors have long been identified and studied. Propensities for greater involve-ment in physically aggressive behaviors by some individuals have been found in multiplestudies (for gender differences see Connor et al., (2003), for differences in children seeGuerra, Huesmann, & Spindler (2003) and Schwartz & Proctor (2000), for differences inadults see Shaver & Mikulincer (2011)). In addition, aggression has been found to be aconsistent within individuals when comparing behaviors from childhood to adolescence(Frick & White, 2008; Connor, 2012), and comparing behaviors from childhood to adult-hood (Huesmann et al. 1984; Huesmann & Eron 1989; Piquero et al., 2012). Finally,high-aggression personality traits have been shown to be a strong predictor of differ-ences in support for state violence (Kalmoe 2013).
3.1 What is Trait Aggression?
Aggression itself refers to a behavior toward another person carried out with the imme-diate intention of inflicting harm (Anderson & Bushman 2002). Violence, as described bypsychologists, generally refers to the most severe types of aggression and can, therefore,
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be thought of as a sub-category of aggression, i.e. all types of violent acts are aggressivebut not all aggressive acts are violent. The variations in aggression from one individual tothe next depends on: how an individual perceives his or her environment and the threatswithin; expectations on how an individual will respond to situations; and the individual’sbelief of his or her own abilities to respond to situations (DeWall, Anderson & Bushman,2011).
Trait aggression is the measure of psychological differences in aggressive behavior innormal routine interactions. These interactions can range from increased propensities toengage in verbal arguments to increased propensities for physical violence. Trait aggres-sion, like all personality traits, has a diverse set of social and biological origins. Theseorigins influence and individual’s level of trait aggression and independently and by in-teracting with each other which produces an individual varying level of aggression thatis both stable and measurable. The influences include genetic predispositions (Coccaroet al., 1997; Caspi et al., 2002; McIntyre et al. 2007; McDermott et. al. 2009), childhoodtrauma (Caspi, et al. 2002, Farrington 2007), and exposure to high levels of violence as achild without directly experiencing physical trauma (Tooby & Cosmides, 1995; Bushman& Huesmann, 2006).
Trait aggression is, quite obviously, not a comprehensive measure of personality. It issimply one trait among dozens, if not hundreds, of personality traits that each individualpossesses and does not capture all the variation in human personality. What trait ag-gression offers, however, is a relatively narrow measure of a particularly relevant trait.While the dominant paradigm currently used by psychologist to measure personality isthe ‘Big Five Model’, the broad abstraction of this model is complemented by the additionof a trait theorized to be relevant to the particular decision being observed.1
1In future work, see section 6.4, I plan on utilizing the Big Five model and several additional traits.
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By understanding trait aggression, researchers have explained both within-person andsituation-specific stability in aggression because people behave similarly when facedwith similar events over time. Trait aggression also helps explain variation in judgmentsregarding the cost and benefits of behavioral options, identifying and classification of po-tential threats, and how beliefs about specific groups (i.e. opposing ethnic groups withina country or differing parties engaging in international conflicts) guide an individual’sbehavior during the decision-making process (DeWall, Anderson & Bushman, 2011).
Using trait aggression to better understand an individual’s decision to join a rebel grouprequires an understanding of the process that trait aggression plays in this decision. Fig-ure 3.1 below outlines a simplified model of the decision process individuals go throughwhen deciding to join a rebel group. Inputs are the social factors and experiences thatdirectly effect each person’s unique decision-making process. These inputs can be catego-rized as part of the personal experiences of each person and the specific conflict contexts.The personal experiences include all the relevant history a person brings to the decision,such as past experiences with violence in general, attitudes toward and experiences withthe potential targets of the rebel group, the decision maker’s age and family structure(i.e. whether the person is the primary provider), levels of self-efficacy, and cognitionabilities.2 Conflict context inputs are the relevant features of the situation in which therebel group is forming.3 These can include a range of variables including potential size ofthe rebel group, access to weaponry, repression or provocation by the rebel group’s en-emies, local economic opportunities, and threats or incentives offered by the group. Thepersonal and conflict context are not necessarily mutually exclusive but are relatively
2This list is hardly exhaustive and can contain an almost endless number of variables.3Note that the conflict context node in Figure 3.1 references the current environment surrounding thedeveloping rebel group. This is not the same as the environmental factors that affect personality trait for-mation because personality traits are generally solidified in childhood while joining a rebel group happensat least during adolescence and usually years later.
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independent. Some personal factors can be heightened by the conflict context and someconflict factors maybe the result of an aggregation of personal factors. For example, alack of economic opportunities caused by government repression is more acute for individ-uals who are the primary provider of income for their family, and repression by the rebelgroup’s enemy can produce strong personal negative attitudes in those who suffered most.









All input variables influence the decision to join a rebel group through the filter of eachperson’s personality, as indicated by ‘Trait Aggression’ in Figure 3.1. For instance, andceteris paribus, individuals with high levels of trait aggression are more likely to feel that
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violence is the correct response after they have suffered repression (personal input) whencompared to individuals with low levels of trait aggression. This is because the attrac-tion to violence is greater for individuals with high-trait aggression than for individualswith low-trait aggression in all situations. Or, again ceteris paribus, individuals withhigh levels of trait aggression may be more attracted to the opportunity to use weapons(conflict context input) than individuals with low levels of trait aggression, again becausehigh-trait aggressive individuals act and feel more aggressively – often automatically andwithout awareness – when compared to low-trait aggressive individuals.
For example, consider a scenario where a rebel group’s enemy sends a radio message topotential joiners stating that joining the rebellion will result in harsh punishment againstjoiners or their families. This situation and similar ones are known to have occurred dur-ing the run-up to the Syrian Civil War in messages from the Assad government regime,as well as during the 1970s Ugandan conflict from the country’s president, Idi Amin. Alow-trait aggressive person is more likely to perceive that message as a warning to avoidjoining the rebel group and therefore obey, while a high-trait aggressive individual ismore likely to perceive the same message as a threat to themselves or family members,and as a result be more inclined to play an active role in the rebellion. The same ex-ternal input is filtered by the individual’s trait aggressiveness which determines, to alarge extent, how the inputs are interpreted and the individual behaviorally responds.4This filtering process explains how the same conflict context and personal inputs, whichencompass what rationalist explanations describe as cost and benefits, can produce bothjoiners and non-joiners.5
4For more information about how the same input can be interpreted differently based on personalitytraits and particularly aggression, see Crick & Dodge (1994) and Crick & Dodge (1996) where the authorsfind that ‘hostile-attribution-bias children’ process the same stimuli as intentional affronts compared tonon-bias children.5The structure presented here is similar to the common framework in psychological accounts of behaviorthat reconcile observed changes in behavior due to shifting conflict factors with predictions of a high levelof behavioral stability over time (see Mischel & Shoda (1995) and Mischel & Shoda (1998) for more detail).
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Using this framework, I argue that conflict context and trait aggression are related be-cause the former (context) provides the avenue for expressing the latter (trait). High-traitaggression will bring about participation in rebellion because the act of participationpermits for the repeated expression of aggression through violence. This leads to theprimary hypothesis of this chapter:
• Hypothesis 1: People who choose to join rebel groups have higher trait aggressionthan people who do not (assuming similar exteranl stimuli).
3.2 Research Design
As discussed in Chapter 2 and illustrated in Figure 3.2, aggression is formed from aninteraction between biology and environment. Every person’s propensity for aggressionoriginates with a baseline level of genetic predisposition toward aggressive actions. Thisbaseline propensity also interacts with the person’s experiences to create a distinct levelof aggression in each individual. In the case of aggression, exposure to violence or violentimages during early childhood or early adolescence is generally considered the primarylife experience that raise an individual’s level of aggression (Farrington, 2007).
Figure 3.2: Aggression Formation




This combination of biology and experience makes testing any personality trait, partic-ularly aggression, difficult in a population of former rebels because the experience ofparticipating in a rebel group is itself likely to alter the trait’s measures. For exam-ple, Löckenhoff et al., (2009) find that while personality traits are quite stable over time,highly stressful and adverse events have pronounced and predictable effects on person-ality traits, especially when measured shortly after the event.6 Participation in a rebelgroup is unquestionably both a stressful and traumatic event and is therefore likely tobias measurements of aggression upwards in any sample of former rebels.7
The measurement-bias problem that must be overcome is that it is nearly impossible toobserve the outcome of a subject who has not served in combat. This is not an unusualproblem in political science, and the standard solution to this type of ‘missing data’ issue(which is commonly known as the ‘lack of a counter-factual’) is to create a control groupand compare the average effect between the treated group (volunteers) and the controlgroup (non-volunteers).8 Therefore, the ideal design to test the personality profile ofrebels would be to conduct personality tests in a population of potential rebels bothbefore and after the onset of a civil war, or civil unrest, and then compare the results be-tween those individuals who joined the rebellion (treated) and those that did not (control).This method would then allow for a more unbiased measure of personality traits as wellas a way to observe and calculate the effect of rebel participation on the measured traits.Given the difficulty in predicting with accuracy when and where a rebellion is likely to
6Löckenhoff et.al., (2009) test and measure the Big-5 model of personality and find that trauma leads toincreases in neuroticism and decreases in extraversion and agreeableness, but it is reasonable to assumethe same is true for other traits and perhaps even more so when the trauma and trait align as well as rebelgroup participation and aggression.7For some former rebels it is likely true that participation in a conflict has lasting and terrible psycho-logical consequences, but there is some evidence that the average psychological consequences across allparticipants is relatively moderate. In addition, Blattman & Annan (2013) finds that the impact of rebelgroup participation on observed aggressive acts such as physical altercations is weak or non-existent inpopulations of former combatants.8For good discussions on the logic behind creating a control group and estimating treatment effects seeImbens (2004) and Rubin (1974).
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begin, any existing personality-trait measures of rebels are likely to take place on formerrebels (i.e. after the fact) and not potential rebels as the above design dictates. Therefore,a proxy control (via group comparison or statistically) for the effect of the participationis necessary to test the primary hypothesis of this chapter with any degree of confidence.9
To surpass this significant research design hurdle, the below design utilizes data thatcontain a key distinction in rebel-group members – both rebel volunteers and rebel ab-ductees. The horrible reality that some rebels were abducted into the group offers anunusual mix of subjects who have roughly the same conflict experience but considerablevariation in how they became rebel group members. Child abductions, while sad, are notuncommon in civil war. The scale and scope of abductions in the Great Lakes Region ofAfrica, where the data originates, however, is somewhat unusual. This uniqueness offersthe necessary mechanism to control for potential spuriousness between tests on joiningbehavior and psychological traits. In place of the ideal design mentioned above, whereindividuals who did not join the rebels make up the comparison group, the comparisongroup for this chapter is composed of involuntary combatants. The comparison groups inthis design are, therefore, not between treatment and control but within treatment whilecontrolling for participation type. To illustrate the applicability of this design, a briefdiscussion of the data and conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) followsin the next section.
9In the future it will be increasingly possible to bypass this problem and give personality measures topopulations that are likely to experience a rebellion because of the increasing ability to accurately predictwhere and when rebellions will occur. In particular, I think the work by Jay Ulfelder, Patrick Brandt, andPhilip Schrodt is quite compelling. If possible, in future work I plan to use these forecasting models tostrategically place personality questionnaires in developing rebellions.
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3.3 Data
The data presented below was obtained from two datasets compiled from interviews withformer rebels in the DRC. Both datasets were produced by psychologists primarily inter-ested in studying PTSD symptoms and post-conflict reintegration into local communities.In researching PTSD symptoms, the interviewers also asked the subjects how they wererecruited into the rebel group (volunteer vs. abduction) and measure a version of traitaggression called “appetitive aggression.” Appetitive aggression is a measure of aggres-sion specifically designed by the research team “to assess a participant’s attraction toviolence” and is tailored for “populations that have committed serious types of violentacts like aggravated assaults or murder” (Weierstall and Elbert, 2011).
The purpose of the measure was not, however, to assess aggression in rebel group mem-bers but, rather, to provide a baseline of aggression when assessing PTSD symptoms.This measure was needed by the research team in order to account for individual ag-gression variation as higher levels of aggression traits tend to protect against individualssuffering from PTSD. The measure has been validated in a total of 2,632 interviews offormer combatants or participants in the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Colombia, Vietnam andWorld War II conflicts. The Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient for the measure’s reliability is.80. Furthermore, it is specifically designed to assess aggression in individuals who haveperpetrated or suffered from large-scale violent actions. The scale is designed to mea-sure a distinct construct of human proactive aggression similar to the one described inVitiello & Stoff (1997) which corresponds directly to trait aggression. The measure con-tains questions about the subject’s perception of aggression and their inclination towardaggressive actions. The entire measure is contained in fifteen questions which are scoredon a five-point Likert scale ranging from 0 to 4 – with some of the items reverse-scoredwhen the scale was inverted. Two sample questions are provided below, but for the com-
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plete scale, see the Appendix.10
• Did you harm others, just because you wanted to, without having a reason / order?
– 0 = Not at all.
– 1 = Wants to harm others but doesn’t have the heart to do so.
– 2 = Slightly overdoes orders when he/she wants to harm another person.
– 3 = Harms others beyond duty as long as these acts are to some extendconsistent with the missions goals.
– 4 = Follows a strong desire to harm others for fun in most of the cases irre-spective of any instructions/orders.
• Once you got used to being cruel, did you want to be crueler and crueler?
– 0 = Not at all.
– 1 = Reports no general increase in the extent of cruelty, but has experiencedtimes where he/she felt a drive to act out crueler methods.
– 2 = Reports a trend for the increase of cruelty but doesn’t necessarily have tobe crueler every time.
– 3 = Reports a remarkable increase in cruel behavior to achieve the same stim-ulation. Spends time to preconceive humiliating acts.
– 4 = Reports no saturation for the urge to behave cruel even if performing utmostcruel acts.
10It should be noted that the AAS scale was not designed to directly test trait aggression and is notcompletely comparable to trait aggression measures used in traditional psychological studies. It is, intheory, a trait measure of some type or form of aggression that is probably similar to proactive aggression(discussed in the next chapter). A more complete and detailed study (like that described in Chapter 6) isneeded to better assess how close the AAS measure aligns with trait aggression.
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The first of the two surveys is entitled the General Armed Group Survey (GAGS) and wascollected in 2009. The data from this survey consist of 95 individual interviews with formerrebels in the Eastern DRC and include questions about joining behavior (volunteered vs.abducted), several demographic measures and the Appetitive Aggression Scale (AAS). Ofthe 95 subjects, 57 were abducted and 38 volunteered. The second survey is entitled theNorth Kivu PTSD Survey and was collected in 2011.11 The data from this survey consistof 224 individual interviews with former rebels in the eastern DRC, and also include ques-tions about joining behavior (volunteered vs. abducted), several demographic measuresand the Appetitive Aggression Scale (AAS). Of the 224 subjects, 119 were abducted and105 volunteered12
Both surveys have a mixture of subjects from different rebel groups, and, to my knowledge,there is no overlap of individuals between the two surveys. The surveys ask identicalAAS questions and very similar demographic questions. The similarities between the twosurveys make combining the surveys ideal for analyzing variation in AAS scores. Themain differences in the two survey designs are found in the questions about the subject’sparticipation in violent events. The GAGS survey asks questions about the number ofcombat events while the KIVU survey focuses on the type of combat events (via questionsabout specific events). These differences are discussed in greater detail in the followingsections. Using the surveys, the following two relationships are expected and used totest the chapter’s primary hypothesis mentioned above.
• Hypothesis Tests
– Measurement 1: volunteers will have higher AAS scores than abductees.
– Measurement 2: volunteers will perpetrate more violent actions that abductees.
11This title and name are my own and not given by the original research team.12Several of the subjects from the entire sample were dropped because of lacking or unreliable data. Thedata described below are those that remained.
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3.4 Results
In order to confidently use these two data sets, I need to first establish that the twogroups (volunteers and abductees) are comparable. Generally, I expect that any post-conflict variation in the data between volunteers and abductees will reflect three distincttypes of differences: pre-conflict differences, the differences in the impact of war experi-ences13 and, finally, the selection effects of conflict participation. The argument presentedin Chapter 2 and the beginning of this chapter is predicated, however, on examining onlypre-conflict differences. Therefore, the final two differences must be controlled or removedin order to produce reliable and unbiased results. Below, I outline three different tasksnecessary to remove potential bias from the analysis and test the two measures men-tioned above to confirm the chapter’s primary hypothesis.
3.4.1 Pre-Conflict Bias
The first task is to compare the two groups (volunteers and abductees) to see if they’resimilar enough on their non-AAS measures to make cross-comparison possible. It maybe easier to think of this type of design as quasi-experimental. Therefore, before testingthe differences in AAS scores, I need to verify that the treatment (participation in conflictin this case) is relatively similar across the groups.14 The crucial assumption necessaryfor testing the chapter’s primary hypothesis is that the subpopulations of volunteers andabductees are similar enough for meaningful comparisons. Four demographic variablesare available to examine the credibility of this assumption. First, Table 3.1 illustrates abasic first analysis of the two groups.
13This difference is predicated on understanding that identical war experiences are likely to effect peopledifferently because of pre-existing psychological coping abilities.14This design is similar to Blattman & Annan (2010) and the discussions in Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983)about treatment effect.
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Table 3.1: Comparison of Group MeansN=299 Volunteer Abducted Diff. of MeansAge 22.5 21.3 1.2Age Joined 19.7 16.9 2.8Education Scale=0-5 2.45 2.70 0.25
Note: 65% demobilized within 1 year of interview and only 14% demobilized more than 3 years from interviewNote: * significant at 5%, ** significant at 10%
As Column 1 and 2 in Table 3.1 show, the mean difference between the two groups inage during the interview, age at which they joined, and education levels is generallyquite small. Column 3 reports that none of the difference of means for age, age joined oreducation are statistically significant (at 5% or 10% confidence levels) using a Differenceof Means T-Test.15
The primary argument of this chapter is predicated on there being pre-conflict trait-aggression differences between volunteers and abductees. I am, however, observing thedifferences across the two groups in post-conflict interviews. This means that reliableresults from any analysis requires that the abduction method be, at least, partially ran-dom. Or more directly, the abduction method must be unrelated to the outcome variableof interest and, therefore, not correlated with any unobserved traits that might effect AASscores. In this regard, several potential sources of the relation between abduction andaggression exist. For example, smarter individuals may not have been abducted withthe same frequency as duller individuals because they were better able to hide and in-telligence and aggression are correlated. Or perhaps the rebel groups targeted theirabductions toward some particular type of individual or group that they felt would makegood rebels – which again might be correlated with measures of aggression. Finally,
15Note that the difference in age when interviewed is smaller in the data than has been previously foundin similar studies by Blattman & Annan (2010). While I have no way of knowing for sure, I suspect thisis due to the interviews being conducted temporally closer to rebel group participation than the otherstudies. Young individuals who migrated away from the conflict had less time to return to the locationswhere interviews took place compared to the previous studies.
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some abductees might have been more willing to go with rebels than others and, there-fore, be more like volunteers in their personality traits. Indeed, it is likely that some ofthe abductees would have likely volunteered if given more time or opportunity. Thesethree scenarios are just a sample of potential correlations between abduction and per-sonality traits as there are dozens of other possible scenarios. Neither this design, northe available data, can completely remove the concern of unobserved selection effectsthrough a non-random abduction process, but the abduction tactics of the region do offersome encouraging assistance.
While horrible and life-threatening, the abduction tactics in the eastern DRC conflictswere both indiscriminate and quite extensive. Interviews with former rebels from theDRC indicate that efforts to abduct new members were not selective nor designed aroundspecific goals. Instead, the raiding rebel groups would travel out to villages and small iso-lated farming households in search of both supplies and youths to abduct. These raidingparties would usually enter homes early in the morning and abduct all physically capablemembers of the household and then release those individuals who were not useful (mostlynon-adolescent males) a day or two later. The villages and farms where abduction oc-curred were known beforehand, but the houses and abductees were unspecified prior toentrance and the raids were seemingly conducted in an ad hoc manner.
According to several interviews with former rebels responsible for abductions, between60% and 75% of abductions took place in this manner while the remaining abductionsoccurred along roadsides and at travel stops where the rebels simply abducted any ado-lescent males they encountered (Blattman & Annan, 2013; Autesserre, 2010; Annan, etal., 2011). This near-random pattern of abductions is supported by the mean statisticsbetween volunteers and abductees in Table 3.1. In addition, the randomness of abduc-tions is also detailed in two well-regarded survey research articles on similar conflicts
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by Blattman & Annan (2013). The study, using the extensive SWAY survey of more than1,100 former Lord’s Resistance Army members in northern Uganda (a conflict compara-ble to that seen in the DRC), is able to find significant predictors of abduction amongwealth, education, or geo-location on either the abductees themselves or their parents.The evidence in Table 3.1 and the abduction methods are a first step in confirming thatvolunteers and abductees are similar enough to assume a high level of unconfoundednesson any unobserved variables that might create pre-conflict bias.
3.4.2 Within-Conflict Bias
Individual war experiences are far from uniform. Different exposures to violence from dif-ferent conflict experiences could affect the AAS scores of post-conflict interviews. Forexample, less than one-sixth of Americans deployed to Vietnam experienced combat first-hand. On the civil-war side of research, Humphreys and Weinstein (2005) show thatthe variation in the abusiveness of military units varies dramatically and positively cor-relates with reintegration success and PTSD symptoms following the war in Sierra Leone.
This type of conflict-experience variation could produce results that show support forthe primary hypothesis mentioned above, but operate through a different casual pathwaythan the one I provide. For example, it is entirely possible that volunteers are deployedto different types of combat actions than abductees or that volunteers spend many moredays within rebel groups than abductees. Therefore, the second task to ensuring a non-bias test is examining the war experiences between the two groups for consistency.
If the war experiences of volunteers and abductees are somehow different enough thatthe average effect of conflict exposure varies, then post-conflict AAS scores would beunsystematically biased. As rows 1 and 2 in Table 3.2 indicate, the conflict experiences
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between the two groups are different. Row 1 shows that the mean number of days avolunteer spent with his rebel group was 700 days while the mean number of days anabducted individual spent with his group was 496 days. The mean difference betweenthese two groups is 204 days and statistically significant at the 5% confidence level, againusing a Difference of Means T-Test. Row 2 indicates that the mean number of combatactions between the two groups follows a similar pattern although the number of subjectsis reduced to 85 due to this question only being asked during the GAGS interviews.16The mean number of combat actions for volunteers is 12.2 and 6.3 for abductees whichproduces a difference in mean numbers of actions of 5.9, which is statistically significantat the 10% confidence level.
Table 3.2: Comparison of ExperienceVolunteer Abducted Diff. of MeansDays w/Group 700 496 204*N=299Number of Combat Actions 12.2 6.3 5.9**n=85Days w/Group (w/o outliers) 700 642 58N=282Number of Combat Actions (w/o outliers) 12.2 8.8 3.4n=74
Note: 65% demobilized within 1 year of interview and only 14% demobilized more than 3 years from interviewNote: * significant at 5%, ** significant at 10%
The differences reported in Table 3.2, row 1 and 2, indicate that volunteers were withtheir respective rebel group for a longer period on average than abductees and that theyparticipated in more fighting. This observed difference in conflict experience is trouble-some for comparisons across the two groups. The difference, however, is driven by a poolof 17 abducted subjects that spent very little time among the rebels, with 16 of the 17
16The variable discussed here is the self-reported number of combat actions. The subjects were askedto estimate the number of combat events they participated in while with their rebel group. This includesfighting against government forces or other rebel groups but not smaller scale events like abduction raids,supply raids on villages or households, or theft-related events.
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abducted for less than two months and significantly younger than the average subject.When these short-time abductees are removed from the analysis, as reported in row 3,the difference in mean number of days spent with the rebel group reduces to a statisti-cally insignificant 58 days. We observe a similar pattern after these short-time outliersare removed from the number of combat actions, reported in row 4. The mean differencebetween volunteers and abductees then reduces to a statistically insignificant differenceof means of 3.4 actions with volunteers having an average of 12.2 actions and abductees8.8 actions. Taken together, rows 3 and 4 in Table 3.2 indicate that the remaining 282subjects are similar enough that results from comparisons between the two groups shouldnot be driven by a difference in the average effect from combat experience.
3.4.3 Aggression Results
Using the subjects remaining after the data sorting reported in the above section, I ex-amined the relationship between aggression and volunteering to join a rebel group usinga sample of former rebels from the DRC. The comparison groups were individuals whovolunteered to join versus individuals who were abducted and forced to join. The resultspresented in Table 3.3 corroborate the primary hypothesis that ‘individuals who join rebelgroups have more aggressive personalities than individuals who do not’.
The Appetitive Aggression Scale assesses the extent of attraction to the perpetrationof violence or the ability to experience violence-related enjoyment and corresponds toMeasurement 1 mentioned above. Relatively high levels of appetitive aggression werepresent in both the the abducted and the volunteer group which is expected given thesubjects’ experiences during the conflict. As row 1 indicates, however, volunteers scoreda mean of 28.9 while abductees scored a mean of 19.6 on the AAS scale which rangesfrom 0 – 60. A Difference of Means test confirms that the 9.3 difference between the two
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group scores is statistically significant at the 5% confidence level, showing that volunteershave, on average, a higher level of trait aggression than abductees. In addition to scoringhigher on the AAS, volunteers also participated in more violent combat events on averagewhich corresponds to Measurement 2 mentioned above. The difference in Table 3.3, row2, indicates that volunteers on average scored themselves a statistically significant 1.7points higher on the “average type of combat action” question than abductees, meaningthey perpetrated more violent acts on average. This scale is scored 0-6 and ranges fromparticipating and witnessing intense fighting (6) to non-violent theft of property (0).
These two results are indicators that volunteers are systematically different in their traitaggression levels even when we control for the experience of combat.
Table 3.3: AAS Difference of MeansVolunteers Abductees Diff. of Means
Appetitive Aggression 28.9 (4.8) 19.6 (4.9) 9.3*n=282, Scale = 0-60
Type of Combat Actions 3.8 (1.1) 2.1 (0.9) 1.7*n=205, Scale = 0-6
Note: * indicate significance at the .05 level
Despite the similarity of volunteers and abductees on demographic variables (Table 3.1),the narrative of abduction practices, and the similarity of conflict experiences betweenthe two groups, it is still possible that some unobserved variation still exists between thetwo groups that accounts for the AAS differences. Therefore, I performed a robustnessanalysis to check the finding reported above. Table 3.4 reports the mean values on the 4variables that exist in both surveys before and after a propensity-matching procedure wasperformed. The full Logit model used for the estimation is available in the Appendix. Themodel used all four variables listed in Table 3.4 and a dependent variable of abduction.
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The model is by necessity a binary model with the outcomes of volunteer and abductee.Either a Logit or Probit model would have been appropriate as the choice of Logit vs.Probit for propensity score matching on a binary outcome is not particularly critical andunlikely to change the results (Smith, 1997; Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). The matchingprocedure was done using the propensity score from the model (provided in the appendix)and based on a nearest neighbor matching criteria.
The choice of which variables to include in the matching procedure, however, is importantas omitting important variables can bias estimates (Heckman, Ichimura & Todd, 1998).In this case the choice is not straightforward as none of the variables was a significantpredictor of abduction. I, therefore, included all four available variables in the matchingprocedure.
Matching is generally used as a way to create ‘experiment-like’ groups to estimate ca-sual treatment effects and is used where one has a group of treated individuals and non-treated individuals. This is not the case, however, in the analysis and results presentedhere. Instead, I am using the matching procedure to try and control for any remainingunobserved pre-conflict bias. It may be useful to think of the utility of matching in thiscase as attempting to randomize the treated individuals, the treatment being rebel groupmembership, into two groups. The two groups are, therefore, balanced on all availablevariables which should, as much as possible, also create balance on non-observed pre-treatment variables. This ’control’ is obtained by balancing all the observed variableswhich is why including all the available variables in the matching procedure was appro-priate. No causal inference is drawn from the matched groups or the procedure, insteadthe matching procedure is simply verifying the inference described in Table 3.3 via a morerigorous process.
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Table 3.4: Matched Mean ScoresNon-Match, N=282 Match, N=68 pairsVolunteer Abducted Volunteer AbductedAge 22.5 21.5 22.1 21.6Age Joined 19.7 16.1 18.0 16.6Education Scale=0-5 2.45 2.67 2.51 2.58
Note: The Non-Matched means differ from Table 3.1 because the N doesn’t include the 17 dropped short-time abductees.
Both the non-matched sample and matched sample are presented in Table 3.4 with 68matched pairs included (half of the full sample).17 Note that the change in means are quitesmall, which is expected because none of the variables predicted abduction well. Table3.5, however, illustrates the utility of the matching procedure by using the matched pairsto further examine whether the AAS score difference between volunteers and abducteesremains among even the most experienced and violent rebels. Using matched pairs ofrebels to conduct this supplementary analysis allows me to control for pre-conflict biaswhile testing the effect of within-conflict bias as much as is possible given the data con-straints.
Table 3.5, row 1, displays the 20 matched pairs with the largest combined scores onthe Days w/Group and Number of Combat Actions variables. To create this measure, Iadded the two variables together for each pair (4 variables total) and included only themost experienced 20 pairs (40 subjects).18 This can also be thought of as the 40 mostexperienced rebels (20 volunteers and 20 abductees) who are also the closest in the fourvariables of age, age joined, education level. The results indicate that even between themost experienced volunteers and abductees, volunteers, on average, score 11.1 pointshigher on the AAS. This finding is again statistically significant at the 5% confidencelevel and similar to the full sample finding in Table 3.3. The mean difference of 11.1 is
17The choice to include only 68 matched pairs in Table 3.4 was completely arbitrary.18The choice to include only 20 matched pairs is completely arbitrary but the results are robust whenusing both 15 or 25 matched pairs.
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Table 3.5: Exposure to ViolenceMost Experienced RebelsVolunteers Abductees Diff. of Means
Appetitive Aggression 34.2 23.1 11.1*N= 20 Matched Pairs Most Violent RebelsVolunteers Abductees Diff. of Means
Appetitive Aggression 36.4 22.1 14.3*N= 20 Matched Pairs
larger, however, than the mean difference in the full sample (9.3) which indicates thatthe AAS scores of volunteers increase more with increased experience than abductees.The data do not allow any more detailed analysis of why this increase happens or whatis driving the observed difference. It is possibly a result of a small subset of very hightrait-aggressive individuals who also stay with the rebel group for a long time and par-ticipate in a large number of combat actions. Or that, the effect of increased experience,which should allow for more exposure to violence, somehow affects high trait-aggressiveindividuals more than low trait-aggressive individuals because aggression plays a morecentral role in their personality.
Row 2 in Table 3.5 tells a similar story. To create this group of matched pairs, I includedthe 20 matched pairs with the highest mean score on the ‘Type of Combat Actions’.19 Thematched pairs included in this row contain the 20 most violent pairs of rebels and the re-sults again indicate that volunteers score higher than abductees. It should also be notedthat both sub-groups, most experienced and most violent, are highly correlated.20 Theresults of Table 3.5 do indicate that the Primary Hypothesis of this chapter is supported
19Again the choice to include only 20 matched pairs is completely arbitrary but the results are robustwhen using both 15 or 25 matched pairs.20I am unsure why such a correlation between the most experienced and violent rebels exist, but it ispossible due to the interview location or structure of the interviews.
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even when controlling for exposure to violence.
3.4.4 Remaining Potential Bias
The above section discussed whether volunteers and abductees were similar on theirnon-AAS measures (first task) and addressed potential bias from the volunteers and ab-ductees having different wartime experiences (second task). This section discusses thethird and final task necessary to validate comparing volunteers and abductees. In civilwar, the death rates of combatants and the migration in and out of conflict by combatantsboth occur at a relatively high rate. Therefore, a conflict selection effect probably occursin that we only observe those rebels that survive and stay in their rebel group.
I call this selection process ‘conflict sorting’. Conflict sorting deals with unequal rates ofdeath and migration across volunteers and abductees. Conflict sorting is likely to haveoccurred in both volunteers and abductees because the interviews only contain individ-uals who were available for interviews during the demobilization process. For example,if high trait aggressive individuals and low trait aggressive individuals are killed at dif-ferent rates, which is quite likely, then any post-conflict interviews would, by necessity,contain a different distribution of trait aggressiveness than the in-conflict reality. Or,again for example, abductees might have migrated out of the camp at a higher rate thanvolunteers, which is again likely, causing the interviewed abductees to not accuratelyrepresent the near-random process of abduction described above. These are only twoexamples of several potential selection effects that could bias the distribution of trait ag-gression in post-conflict interviews. The data, unfortunately, does not allow for completeremoval of this type of bias and only additional data with specifically designed questionsto address this problem will allow me to address this concern. A study of this type isdiscussed in the section entitled ‘Future Directions’ (6.4) later in Chapter 6.
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter examined trait aggression among a sample of former rebels that containedboth volunteers and abductees from conflicts in the DRC.21 A hypothesized relationshipbetween higher levels of trait aggression and volunteering was found and this relation-ship was robust to increased levels of conflict experience. The contribution of this chapterlies in producing the first empirical evidence that personality-trait variation (specificallyaggression) explains the primary research question of this project: why do some individ-uals join rebel groups while others do not?
A number of limitations are evident in this chapter. While the analysis utilized data ontrait aggression from former rebels in the DRC, it does not provide any evidence on theimportance of other personality traits such as risk-taking, threat perception, or the set ofBig-5 traits. Each of these traits needs to be investigated before a complete picture ofpersonality and rebel participation is obtained. Furthermore, the chapter relied solely oninterviews from one area, the DRC, and it is entirely possible that the effect of personalityvaries based on the conflict characteristics or the group of potential participants. Thisissue is further discussed in Chapter 6. Finally, the analysis does a good, but not com-plete, job of addressing the confounding potential biases that are unobserved betweenvolunteers and abductees. Unfortunately, this poses a very difficult problem when study-ing personality in a population of former combatants. To address this concern, differentand innovative research designs are necessary - one of which is discussed at the end ofChapter 6.
21The results from this chapter align well with previous work looking at the differences between volunteersand abductees, although on different topics or with different methods, most notably those in Weierstall etal. (2012a,b) and Weierstall and Elbert (2011).
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Notwithstanding the aforementioned limitations, the chapter highlights the role of personality-trait variation in understanding why some people become rebels. Enhancement of thisdesign and research could expand the understanding of rebels, rebellion, and civil war.In all, this chapter provides a compelling first look at the role of aggression and person-ality in rebel group membership and provides ample direction for future work on the topic.
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Chapter 4Aggression and Decision Making
“Love of war, bellicosity, is the counterpart of the love of peace; but militarismis more, and sometimes less, than the love of war. It covers every systemof thinking and valuing and every complex of feelings which rank militaryinstitutions and ways above the ways of civilian life.” – Alfred Vagts (1937,p.17).
In this Chapter, I assess the relationship between personality and cognition with a fo-cus on the relationship between aggression and decision-making. The argument andhypotheses developed are anchored in the findings, from Chapter 3, that high-trait ag-gressive individuals are more likely to join rebellions. Because aggressive individualsare more likely to be part of rebel groups, it is important to also investigate how ag-gression affects decision-making. Understanding how people with particular personalitytraits, aggression in this case, think through simple rational games can help scholars andpractitioners better design conflict management and re-integration tools. In the first sec-tion of this Chapter, I outline how this analysis applies to the civil-war research programon rebel joining and generally to the study of rebellion and civil conflict. In the secondsection, I provide the chapter’s research design and a description of the data and datageneration process. In the final section, I provide a detailed analysis of the data and testtwo hypotheses.
In addition, this chapter innovates from other research designed to study conflict by ty-
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ing together both personality and physiological factors into an experiment which conflictscholars will recognize as simulating a conflict-bargaining environment. I present a noveldesign that measures both emotional arousal (through physiological arousal) and traitaggression as a window into System I and II (automatic versus reactive or intuitive versusthoughtful) decision-making. This innovation is important because emotions and person-ality traits play a greater role in conflict behavior than we are comfortable acknowledging.I do not, however, offer any judgment about the superiority of one decision-making processover the other. Instead, I simply argue that understanding more about decisions similar tothose made during conflicts increases knowledge and understanding about both rebellionand civil war.
4.1 The Costs and Benefits of Conflict
Explaining rebel-joining behavior and rebel behavior in general has primarily fallen torational-choice theorists. These scholars generally view rebellion as an effort of collectivedissent and, therefore, apply the research on Collective Action (CA) in their explanations.This is most clearly seen in Lichbach (1995). Lichbach argues quite emphatically thatrebel joining behavior is best understood through the rational actor approach. Further-more, Lichbach argues, again quite emphatically, that theories of Collective Action arebetter than theories of Deprived Actors (DA). Indeed, The Rebel’s Dilemma, by Lichbach’sown contention, is intended to, “establish the value of the CA research program in conflictstudies” (p. 325).
Because Lichbach and others use the research on collective action as the bases for theirexplanations, the decision to join a rebel group (and other rebel behaviors) are explainedthrough individual calculations of costs and benefits. These decisions are modeled based
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on three key assumptions that most rational-choice theories require.1 The first assumptionis that decisions involve utility maximization – the understanding that a person maximizesutility when confronted with an array of choices. While there are disagreements aboutwhat and how individuals maximize, “maximization of some sort” is almost universallyaccepted by rational-choice theorists (Arrow, 1951, 3). The second key assumption forrational-choice theorists in conflict (and all other collective actions) is that the relevantmaximizing agents are individuals. Individuals are the subjects of rational-choice mod-els and collective action is seen as a process by which individual preferences emerge.Finally, the last assumption is that rational-choice models apply equally to all personsunder study.2 That is, the modeled decisions, rules, and preferences are similar amongall people. This does not mean that all individuals are identical, but instead that a highdegree of interpersonal consistency is necessary to keep the problems of tractability toa minimum (Strom, 1990, 126).
This chapter and the analysis presented below are part of the Collective Action researchprogram on rebel participation. I am not arguing that Lichbach and others are wrongin their approach but, rather, that individual personality variation can add importantnuances in understanding the behavior of rebels. Similar to the argument in Lichbach(1996), this chapter takes the approach that self-interest and utility maximization are thebaseline model of conflict decisions, but that the conception of rationality as applied torebels needs to be expanded to better mirror reality. Rebel participation is a risky andaggressive undertaking and rebels are those few individuals who are willing to chanceinjury and death. Therefore, accounting for this variance in models of conflict decisionsis relevant and necessary to move the Collective Action research program on rebel par-ticipation forward.
1For a very good discussion on the assumptions of rational-choice theories as applied to work in politicalscience, see Chapter 2 in Green & Shapiro (1994).2This assumption holds, at the very least, when models are empirically applied to decisions, although Iam willing to concede that this homogenous assumption is not always present in pure theoretical models.
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Although Chapter 3 in this dissertation is the first research I am aware of that examinesdifferences in personality traits between rebels and non-rebels, I am not the first to rec-ognize that rebels are somehow different than the average citizen. For example, Mueller(1989) argues that revolutionaries must be those individuals who are extreme risk-takersbecause most attempted revolutions have a high likelihood of failure. Additionally, viainterviews with the Communist guerrillas in Malay, Pye (1956) finds that rebels are par-ticularly risk- prone individuals. In addition, one of the solutions to Lichbach’s ‘Rebel’sDilemma’ (1995) itself is variation in an individual’s propensity to take risks. Lichbach,however, stops at the assertion that some individuals may have a higher ‘taste’ for riskand instead offers only group-level explanations for why this variation exists.3 And noresearch, at least that I am aware of, pays particular attention to the dissimilarity ofrebels from the population to explain rebel or rebel-group behavior.
The awareness that risk-taking and aggressive individuals tend to be the people whomake up rebel groups and the rational-choice models used to explain their behaviors aredisconnected. This disconnection is a result of the fact that most rebel behavior theoriesbased in rational choice are from what Ferejohn (1991, p.282) calls the “thin-rationality”account. In this type of rational modeling, agents are assumed to be rational only as theychoose the option that most efficiently obtains their goals. In contrast, “thick rationality”,also from Ferejohn (1991, p.282), posits that agents are best modeled according to ra-tionality and their specific preference ordering and beliefs. But using individually basedmodels to explain behavior is highly problematic because if people have vastly differentmotives then predicting universal behavior is difficult. If, however, certain types of peo-ple (risk-takers and aggressive individuals) are included in the studied group, then usingthis already occurring selection to create likely preference ordering would be helpful for
3See Lichbach (1995) Chapter3, Section 9 for this argument. In the main contention, Lichbach claimsthat wealthy, independent, or unsuccessful people are those most likely to take risk.
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rational-choice modeling. Or, stated another way, the decision to join a rebel group andthe behavior of rebels can be better understood if the rational choice models used topredict the behavior included the insight that the individuals who make up rebel groupssystematically vary in their perception of the severity of cost and their attraction to po-tential benefits when compared to the general population.
For example, if we examine the participation in rebel groups from the perspective of rebels,it is apparent that cost and benefits are highly related. Benefits are some function ofcosts. The participatory benefit that people potentially receive from their involvement ina rebel group will be affected by their perception of the potential cost they may incurwhen asked to commit violent and aggressive actions. As I explained in Chapters 2 and 3,an individual’s attraction to violence and aggressive actions is shaped by his personalitytraits. This means the perceived personal cost of having to commit violent actions alsovaries across individuals and, therefore, so does the perceived benefit of participation.Finally, this means that the order of preferences in a rational-choice model for joining arebel group – which are shaped by the perceptions of the cost and benefits of membership– are, at least partially, generated by the individual’s personality traits.4
I am not the first researcher to try and understand the underlying preference forma-tion mechanisms in conflict-related decisions. Indeed, a plethora of work exist on thisfront. Recently, however, conflict scholars have begun studying rationalist explanationsby examining the behavioral foundations of bargaining using both lab and field exper-iments. Specifically a proliferation of work using human subjects in hypothetical, butcleverly designed, bargaining situations has discovered a consistent difference in indi-vidual respondences to the same conflict-related simulations (Crawford, 2000; Mercer,2006; Butler, Bellman & Kichiyev, 2007; Tomz, 2007; Tingley & Wang, 2010; Tingley &
4Without reference to personality, books by Hirschman (1982) an Dennis (1991) make a very similarargument about those individuals who choose to participate in collective actions.
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Walter, 2011; Tingley, 2011). For example, Tingley, Lee and Renshon (2014) examine howindividuals who have a more emotion-based decision-making process are less prone tocommitment problems in a game that manipulates bargaining-power dynamics similar tothose observed in conflict negotiations. In addition, some research has begun examiningthe source of observed individual-level variation in commitment games. This work gener-ally argues that biological variation, measured through hormonal or genetic differences,accounts for variation in either preference formation, cognition type, or both (Rosen, 2004;McDermott et al., 2007; McDermott, Fowler & Smirnov, 2008; McDermott et al., 2009).
While still a new trend in conflict scholarship, this type of rational-model testing isold hat in other fields. For instance, research in psychology and sociology, comprisingseveral different types of methods and designs, generally finds that individuals deviatefrom rational expectations for a variety of different reasons. For example, people displayinformation-processing bias, confirmation bias, incorrect assessment of probabilities, un-derassessment of resolve, or one of several other violations to rational-utility theory.5This work has become so expansive that scholars generally parse the research on differ-ences between rational models and individual differences into two categories.
In the first category are those who argue that individual differences in rationality comefrom sources such as performance errors, lapses in attention, memory differences, andcomputational limitations. This area of research contends that observed differences arenot a function of individual differences in rationality but differing ‘mistakes’ in the player’slogic. In the second category, supporters argue that observed individual differences inrationality come from systematic irrationalities in the players (Stanovich & West, 2000).This Chapter fits well in the second category, although I am hesitant to use term ‘irra-tional’ because it implies that those individuals who differ from the model simply do not
5For a summary of the research on individual differences and reasoning outside conflict studies that isvery detailed but a bit dated, see Stanovich (1999).
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weigh cost and benefits, as opposed to weighing cost and benefits differently. In line withthe second category of understanding why some individuals differ in their calculations, Icontend that personality-trait variation (particularly aggression) is one important way toexplain individual differences from rational-choice models of conflict behaviors because itshapes how the cost and benefits of the action are perceived. The experiments below aredesigned designed specifically to confirm or deny that contention.
In sum, underlying this Chapter, and indeed this entire dissertation, is the assumptionthat two people can process the same information differently. In the civil-war literature,however, it is much more common for scholars to base their research in the underlyingassumption that uniform logical, rational calculations form the basis of decisions, eventhough there is ample anecdotal evidence to suggest that some aspect of psychology im-pacts the decision-making process. Furthermore, because Chapter 3 illustrates that onepsychological aspect found in rebel groups is likely to be high levels of trait aggression,it might be useful to know how individuals with high levels of trait aggression make de-cisions, and, just as important, whether they operate in the same way as individuals withlow levels of trait aggression. The most recent work in psychology argues that decisionsare made through specific cognitive processes that extract crucial information from theworld and regulate everyday actions. In addition, it is believed that these processes varyacross individuals because they are based in genetic differences which have been shapedduring evolution to produce specific behavioral distributions that are likely to increasethe survivability of groups (similar to the process discussed in Chapter 2) (Shaw & Wong,1989). The discussion and analysis below are, therefore, designed to both help validatethe underlying assumption of this project and, partially, to show that personality traitscan be a tool to understand behavior variation in a decision framework conflict scholarswill recognize.
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In the next section, I present a research design that links decisions and trait aggression,explain a commonly used theory on decision-making processes and, finally, illustrate howthe results can explain rebel behavior.
4.2 Research Design
To test if trait aggression has an effect on decision-making, I need a structured and con-sistent logical decision to compare to measures of trait aggression. Previous researchcomparing aggressive behavior and decision-making is sparse even in the primary fieldsof psychology and sociology.6 There is, however, a good deal of research comparinggroup behavior to individual behavior in a variety of different experiments and while test-ing aggression. Most of this research comes out of psychology and primarily focuses oncompetitive behaviors as the findings have generally indicated a significant uptick in com-petitive actions when individuals form groups. Generally, this research revolves aroundthe player’s behavior during the process or their behavior relative to their bargainingposition, with only passive mentions of player psychology.
The few examples of relevant research in political science focus on either altruism (some-times considered the opposite of aggression) or levels of testosterone. For example,Fowler (2006) finds that high levels of altruism predict voter turnout and other forms ofpolitical participation. Fowler argues, similar to Chapter 2, that altruism is based in ge-netic differences from evolution and that trait measures can help build a more completepicture of political participation. Fowler’s argument is also similar to the argument in
6Two notable exceptions are a pair of articles by Meier & Hinsz (2004) and Meier, Hinsz & Heimerdinger(2007). In both of these articles, the authors created a simple theory about aggression variance betweengroups and individuals and then conduct an experiment using hot-sauce allocation. Their results confirmthe theory that groups behave more aggressively than individuals, but nothing is implied on whether groupsof aggressive individuals behave more aggressively than groups of non-aggressive individuals.
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Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation – i.e. altruism predicts higher levels of politicalparticipation because individuals with high levels of altruism are more attracted to thetypes of activities that political participation encompasses. In addition, McDermott etal. (2007) find that testosterone predicts aggressive actions in a crisis-simulation gamewhile cortisol predicts non-aggression. McDermott et al. do not, however, relate levelsof testosterone to trait aggression in any way.
To test the relationship between decision-making and aggression I employ the ‘ultima-tum game’ to provide the consistent logical decision necessary to compare to measuresof trait aggression. The ‘ultimatum’ game is well-suited to study the role of aggressionin decision-making because subjects actually experience a cost in order to give a ben-efit to someone else. The game, by design, reveals preferences for either helping youropponent or for punishing your opponent. In the game, the instructor gives Player A acertain amount of goods (10 points in my case) and then instructs the subject to dividethe goods between herself and Player B. This offer – the ultimatum – is final and there isno additional negotiation between the two players. Following the offer in the ultimatumgame, which is unlike the ‘dictator game’, Player B, however, has the opportunity to ac-cept or reject the offer. If Player B accepts the offer each player receives their allotment.If Player B rejects the offer each player gets nothing as there is no agreement – i.e.neither player receives any points. Therefore all rejections result in zero benefit for bothplayers. Rational-choice theories of self-interest predict that B players will accept alloffers because something is always better than nothing and that, knowing this, PlayerA will offer only low amounts (Stahl, 1972; Rubinstein, 1982). Rejections from Player B,as she has forgone any economic benefit, must, therefore, be explained by some sort ofdeviation from pure economic cost-benefit calculations. Using this game, I can uncoverif high levels of trait aggression explain deviations from rational self-interest becausePlayer B should always accept the offer of Player A. All aspects of the game are common
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knowledge and no information is private.
4.2.1 Experiment
The few research projects that utilize experiments in conflict or conflict management re-search are designed to test the rational decision-making framework. Simply stated, theexperiments are designed to test whether people behave the way our formal models pre-dict (i.e. those in Fearon (1995), Lichbach (1995), and Powell (2006)). That rational vs.non-rational dichotomy, however, is really the wrong way to think about decision-makingin terms of conflict. For example, it is probably true that if we ask a large, randomlyselected group of individuals to participate in a rational-choice experiment designed tosimulate conflict dynamics, the observed results would approximate a formal model usingthe same logic. That is not, however, a good design for studying rebel groups (or proba-bly any conflict group) because, as the findings in Chapter 3 show, rebel groups are notcomposed of randomly selected individuals. Therefore, it is incorrect to expect them tobehave like a randomly selected group, or make decisions like a randomly selected group.Instead, the hypotheses below are proposed to test whether the types of individuals, whowe know from Chapter 3 are likely to be rebel-group members, those with high-trait ag-gression, behave in systematically different ways.
In ultimatum games the general prediction is that B players who want the best chanceto earn money will take any offer and, therefore, a self-interested Player A who antic-ipates this will offer the smallest available amount. Contrary to rational-choice theorypredictions, however, several experimental results have found that in ultimatum games,low offers are frequently rejected (see Guth et al., 1982; Roth, 1995; Hoffman et al., 1996;and Cameron, 1999). This high rate of rejection for low offers indicates that some play-ers are willing to forgo benefits in order to punish their opponent. There is no widely
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accepted explanation for this deviation from rationality; however, evidence has emergedthat players who reject low offers are happier, even if they are poorer (Bolton, 1991; Fehr& Schmidt, 1999). Burnham (2007) has found that the origin of low-offer rejections liesin internal individual differences, in his case high levels testosterone, and not in somesort or miscalculation or mistake by the player.7 In addition, Sanfey et al. (2003) arguesthat low offers are often rejected because the offer is perceived as unfair and objectingto unfairness is an adaptive mechanism which we assert to maintain a social reputation.They go on to argue that negative emotions provoked by the perception of unfairness canlead people to sacrifice sometimes considerable financial game in order to punish theirpartner for the insult.
Low offers, by design, induce conflicting motives in Player B’s brain between rational(“accept”) and emotional (“reject”) on the subsequent decision. The important variationin studying rebel-group behavior, however, is not just this accept vs. reject decision.Instead the important variation in studying rebel-group behavior is the deviation of acceptvs. reject behavior in rebel-group members from non-rebel group members. In the belowanalysis this difference is represented by examining individuals with high levels of traitaggression, which Chapter 3 argues exists in rebel groups, and individuals without highlevels of trait aggression. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:
• Aggression Hypothesis: High-aggressive individuals will play the game differentlythan low-aggressive individuals.
– Measurement : Aggressive individuals will be more likely to make the low offerwhen playing as player A (compared to non-aggressive individuals).
7There is some evidence that low rejection offers are based on worries about reputation formation (i.e., ifyou accept a low offer once you will always accept one). This strategy even appears to be quite rational initerated games (Bolton, 1997; Page et al., 2000; Alexander, 2006). The results provided here do not addressthis concern, but there is research that suggests high levels of testosterone and aggression modulateconcern for reputations (Ellingsen, 1997). Ultimately, for a more complete understanding of the role ofreputation, more experiments are necessary.
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– Measurement : Aggressive individuals will be more likely to reject the low offerswhen playing as player B (compared to non-aggressive individuals).
– Measurement : Aggressive pairs will be less likely to reach an agreement thannon-aggressive pairs.
4.2.1.1 Experiment Procedure
Ninety-six undergraduate students (mean age = 20.4) conducted the experiment (50 fe-male and 46 male). All subjects were from the University of Illinois and obtained usingthe Political Science Subject Pool in the Spring 2015 semester. Each subject completeda survey 2–4 weeks before the experiment which measured aggression using the instru-ment suggested by Raine et al. (2006) and provided in the Appendix. The aggressioninstrument is entitled the ‘Reactive–Proactive Aggression Questionnaire’ and contains23 items (11 reactive and 12 proactive). Only the 11 reactive questions are used in theanalysis below, as reactive aggression is considered a better measure of ’trait aggression’and aligns best with the ’Appetitive Aggression Scale’ discussed in Chapter 3.8 Examplesof the reactive questions are “yelled at others when they have annoyed you”, “reactedangrily when provoked by others”, or “felt better after hitting or yelling at someone” –the entire scale is available in the Appendix. Each question was scored with a 0 (never),1 (sometimes), or 2 (often) scale for a potential range of 0–22.
The experiment began with two subjects entering the experiment room after having pre-viously self-registered online for a time and date of participation. After completing theconsent process, both subjects were immediately connected to physiological-arousal sen-sors. Both subjects were then asked to watch a video of approximately three minutes long
8As a robustness check the analysis was also completed using just the proactive measures and theentire questionnaire (proactive and reactive). Generally using the entire questionnaire produced the sameresults as below, but with less significance on each question. The proactive measures alone produced mixedresults as they were significant for the second measure of the Aggression Hypothesis but not the first orthird.
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consisting of relaxing images with calm music in the background. This protocol, whichhas been used in previous research, is designed to establish a baseline measurement forthe sensors (Renshon, Lee & Tingley, 2014). The sensors are designed to measure elec-trodermal reactivity, with two electrodes attached to the wrist of the non-dominant hand(Blascovich et al., 2011). This allowed the skin-conductance level (SCL) to be recordedcontinuously throughout the study (SCLs are discussed in detail below).
Following the video subjects where given a sheet of paper with detailed instructions thatexplained the rules of the bargaining game. In addition, the instructions were explainedverbally and any questions answered. This instruction time served two purposes. First,it ensured that each subject understood the game and the logic behind it, and second, itallowed the sensors enough time to establish a second baseline recording of the skin con-ductance levels during a verbal exchange. According to Blascovich et al. (2011), multiplebaseline recordings during different tasks is optimal for SCL measurement. Following theinstructions, the bargaining game began and was played according to the details in thenext section. After playing the game, subjects took a short post-experiment questionnairethat included questions on their feelings and decisions during the game. The entire ses-sion lasted approximately 40 minutes.
4.2.1.2 Game Set Up
The experimental subjects were anonymously paired with each other and randomly as-signed to positions in the game. The two players (A and B) were placed into a single-period ultimatum game structured in the following way: the game was played for stakesof 10 points. Ultimatum offers were constrained to be either 7 out of 10 points or 2 outof 10 points but the choice of 2 or 7 was completely left to Player A. These two optionswere picked because the focus of the experiment is on studying variances in offer choice
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and rejection behavior. In a number of previous studies using ultimatum games, the lowoffer is either so low that rejection comes with no cost, or so close to half that fairnessis observed and the offer always accepted. Therefore, in ultimatum games where theresearcher is interested in studying variation in offers and responses, it is generally nec-essary to make the offers discreet while also ensuring that the low offers have a probablechoice of acceptance (for an example, see Guth et al. (1982) or Burnham (2007)). The twochoices available to Player A represent two distinct risk vs. reward behaviors. To clarify,those Player A’s who offer 7 points are making a low-risk and low-reward decision. Be-cause they know that Player B is likely to accept 7-point offers which ensures points forboth players but only 3 points for themselves. Player As who offer 2 points, however, aremaking a high-risk and high-reward decision because Player B is more likely to rejectthese low offers. Therefore, the Player As who make the 2-point offer are willing to riskgetting no points for the possibility of getting the higher amount of points (7). In all casesPlayer A must offer either 2 or 7 points and Player B must accept or reject the offer. Thegame was played only once and the offer and response recorded.9
4.2.2 Skin Conductivity Measurement
In addition to the above game and surveys, the participants’ skin conductance levels (SCL)were measured throughout the experiments. Both subjects received the SCL measurementin each experiment. SCL is an indicator of increased emotional arousal during decision-making and clear sign that the subject’s brain is using an emotion-based decision process(for verification, see Fowles et al., 1981; Sequeira et al., 2009). Measures of skin con-ductivity are revealed by the amount of electricity that passes between two electrodestouching the skin. Changes in conductance levels are related to microscopic secretionfrom the eccrine (skin) sweat glands which increases conductance because sweat is an
9To incentivize the game, and explained during the instructions, each player was given 1 entrance intoa random lottery for a $50 Visa gift card for each point he or she obtained. This meant that both Player Aand Player B wanted as many points as possible.
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electrolyte (salt and water) solution (i.e., more sweat means more conductance). Thebrain processes involved in eccrine sweating are relatively complex, but the areas of thebrain that regulate sweating are crucially involved in emotion-based processes (Boucsein,1992). Thus, skin conductance is often used as a valid and reliable indicator of emotionalarousal (Figner and Murphy, 2011).
Conductance levels are difficult to control consciously and generally indicate increasedactivity in the region of the brain responsible for intuitive decision-making and not inthe region related to deliberate decision-making (Cacioppo et al., 1997, 1999). Skin con-ductance levels cannot, however, distinguish between which emotion is active or eventhe general direction of emotion (i.e., positive vs. negative). Instead, skin conductancelevels are used as a measure of the intensity of emotional arousal and an indicator of anemotion-based decision-making process.
Conductance levels are generally measured via a small electronic device placed on thesubject’s hand (usually the fingers, palm or wrist). The devices were placed on the wristduring this experiment because previous work has indicated that sweat in that area isstrongly related to mental processes and not to thermoregulation (Boucsein, 1992). Thedevices used were called ’Q-sensor pods’ and produced by the Affectiva Company. Theyweigh less than 1 ounce and are approximately 1.5 inches in both length and width. Thedevices are attached to the wrist using a neoprene band. The measurements were begunwith the press of a button and ended with the same. After the experiment, the deviceswere removed from the subjects and connected to a computer. Each device then trans-ferred a continuous stream of SCL data.10
10Similar SCL measuring devices and procedures have been used in several experiments to investigatethe relationship between emotions and decisions (for a few examples, see Van’t Wout et al. (2006), Civaiet al. (2010), Figner and Murphy (2011) and Tingley et al. (2014).
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To facilitate the measurement of skin conductance levels I followed the procedure outlinedin Finger and Murphy (2011). The device was placed on the inside wrist of the partic-ipant’s non-dominant hand. Across the subject’s skin and between the two electrodes,the device sends a constant and imperceptible voltage that is recorded at a rate of 32distinct measurements per second.11 Changes in conductance are bidirectional (can bothincrease and decrease). These measurements were converted to a time-series datasetby the software provided by the manufacturer. The software produces a statistic of aper-second average of the 32 SCL measurements for each second between the devicebeing turned on and being turned off.
To further validate the SCL analysis, I created a dual-period baseline of the individual’scombined level which watching the video and reading the game instructions. Becausethe devices do not have the ability to track changes relative to real time, I recorded ina spreadsheet the time when the SCL measurements were begun, when the video be-gan and ended, when the instructions began and ended, and when the game began andended. Combined with the device output, these times allow me to create ‘time zones’ ofSCL measurements for each subject with the time zones being created during the ‘video’,‘instructions’, and ‘game’ portions of the experiment. Additionally, to allow for slight vari-ations in the time recording, I removed the first and last 5 seconds in each time slot.The variables relevant to the analysis entitled ‘baseline’ and ‘game’ were then created.The ‘baseline’ variable is the combined mean SCL during the video and instruction time
11Note that several different types of skin-conductance measurements are commonly used in psychophys-iology experiments and different conductance measurements are best used for investigating different typesof responses. For example, one such measurement is called Skin Conductance Rate (SCR) and is measuredat a rate of 1,000-2,000 measurements per second. SCRs can determine emotion spikes or peaks duringspecific short-term activities or during interview questions. SCRs are generally analyzed using some typeof ANOVA with changes in amplitude being reported. The type of conductance measurement I used is calledSkin Conductance Level (SCL) and is measured at a much slower rate of 20-40 measurements per second.SCLs are used to measure changes in the average use of emotion during longer decision processes andare best analyzed using the difference in means between different periods of activity. SCLs are not recom-mended for analyzing rapid changes in emotion or for changes in quick tasks. For a full explanation of thedifferences between skin conductance measurements including SCRs and SCLs see Braithwaite, Watson,Jones & Rowe (2013).
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zones for each subject. The ‘game’ variable the mean SCL during the ‘game’ time zone.Therefore, the generated physiological variable used in the below statistical analysis isthe difference between the ‘baseline’ mean and the ‘game’ mean which is distinct for eachsubject. Individual differences in natural skin conductance levels vary widely and, there-fore, comparison across individuals is not recommended.12 Instead, the data and analysisare all recorded and performed within each subject.
For example, Subject 33’s mean skin-conductance levels were 16.06212 during the videoand 16.04778 while reading the instructions which produced a baseline mean of 16.05460.During the game, Subject 33’s SC levels increased to 16.52001, however, which produceda difference between the baseline mean and the game mean of 0.46541. This is distinctlydifferent from Subject 61’s mean skin-conductance levels which were 0.26336 during thevideo and 0.262183 while reading the instructions which produced a baseline mean of0.262232. During the game, Subject 61’s SC levels also increased to 0.278894, however,which produced a difference between the baseline mean and the game mean of 0.01662.The large variation between the mean levels of Subject 33 and 61 are due to naturallyoccurring variance in SCL – usually a result from skin oils and hair – but the variation be-tween their difference of means is due to each subject increasing the conductance levelsof their skin by involuntarily sweating during the game. In this case the higher differencebetween the baseline and game zones in Subject 33 (0.46541 compared to 0.01662) indi-cates an increased use of emotion to make the ultimatum decision in Subject 33 ratherthan Subject 61. In this case both subjects were Player Bs. Finally, this type of within-subject analysis allows me to use the entire sample of players.
Due to the limitations of SCL technology, and using the variables available my hypothesisregarding SCL variation is simply:
12It is possible to normalize (via a Z-Norm procedure) SCL levels but that is not conducted here becauseit offers little more information about the SCL differences.
82
• SCL Hypothesis: Aggressive individuals will show more emotional arousal duringthe decision-making process.
– Measurement : High-aggressive individuals will have higher positive increasesin SCL measurements during the ultimatum game compared with low-aggressiveindividuals.
4.2.2.1 Dual Process Theory
To help explain why understanding individual variation in decision-making is importantfor studying civil conflict in general, and rebels in particular, I offer the Dual-Process The-ory (DPT). The DPT is a psychological theory which argues that an individual’s cognitiveprocessing can be described as two competing, but necessarily parallel decision-makingsystems. The theory has a long history dating back to the beginning of psychology, but Ifollow the widely used and accepted Evans, Over & Manktelow (1993) model which is per-haps best described in Evans (2008). This conceptualization offers two parallel cognitiveprocesses, System I and System II.13 System I, explained by Osman (2004, p.989–990) is,“essentially pragmatic, is based on prior experiences, beliefs, and background knowledgeand achieves goals reliably and efficiently without necessarily accompanying aware-ness. It is characterized as implicit, associative, fast, and highly robust”. And system IIis described as, “explicit, sequential, controllable, and makes high demands of workingmemory. System 2 ... is capable of achieving solutions to logical problems as well as arange of problem types (e.g., hypothesis testing, hypothetical thinking, forecasting, andconsequential decision-making)”.
13The only two articles to use of this theory in conflict studies that I am aware of are Tingley, Lee &Renshon (2014) and Kahneman (2011), but each of these previous works deals directly with foreign policydecision-making and not individual-level behaviors.
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System I processes are highly correlated with emotions, and individuals making a decisionvia a System I process tend to feel an emotion and then justify that decision to explainwhy they feel the emotion (Haidt, 2001). There are two theories of the role of emotionsin System I processing: 1) emotions form a way to navigate for a set of similar decisions;and 2) emotions and the System I processing involve similar parts of the brain (Evans,2008). The activation of System I processes is generally measured by the presence ofemotions because the two are so highly correlated. Distinguishing which emotion (angry,sad, happy, etc.), which is difficult, is not necessary as any emotionate state is consideredan indicator of System I processing and physiological measures of general emotionatestates are much more reliable and easily obtained. System II activation is generally notmeasured and considered to be occurring when no System I indicators exist, because alldecisions are made via one or the other (or a combination) of the two processes.
In the context of conflict studies, however, it is rare for scholars to use emotion to un-derstand decision making. The notable exceptions are Blight (1992), Rosen (2004) andMcDermott (2004). McDermott (2004), in particular, makes the argument that emotionbased decision making is not definitively opposed to rationality, but instead is the processby which the brain makes quick decisions. Emotion according to the most recent work ondecision-making is as essential to cognition as rationality. Emotion has a physiologicalfoundation meaning that stimuli from the world bring about emotional responses – i.e.the flight or fight response which is triggered by a threat, thus creating fear which isacted upon through adrenaline production. Emotional thought is centered in the amyg-dala and the entire decision-making process begins within an emotion-based response towhether the current decision threatens survival or not. After all the brain’s first responsi-bility is to ensure the organism’s survival. Only after the emotional decision process hasrendered the decision as non-threatening are the higher brain functions (located in thepre-frontal cortex) activated. It is, therefore, useful to think of the relationship between
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emotion based decision-making (System I) and rational based decision making (SystemII) as linked in a linear fashion. A decision begins via System I processing and only whenthe emotional-based system determines the decision is non-threatening does System IItake over. This structure requires, by design, that emotion always play a role in rationaldecision making (McDermott, 2004). In addition, the amount of crossover between SystemI and System II processing differs across individuals because it results from the amount ofneural connections between the amygdala and the rest of the brain. While all people useboth System I and System II processing the relatively importance of each varies basedboth on the decision and the person.
4.3 Results
To start with some simple descriptive statistics of the game and its outcomes, the experi-ment consisted of 96 mix-sex subjects divided into 48 pairs. Unknown to the subjects, thepairs were pre-sorted using the subject’s aggression scores from the pre-survey to create3 categories. The 3 categories were High Aggression, Medium Aggression, and Low Ag-gression pairs. To accomplish this task the subject’s aggression scores were divided bythirds and those subjects in the highest third of aggression scores were only allowed toregister for experiment time-slots with other subjects from that category. The procedurewas identical for the medium- and low-aggression pair groupings. This procedure meantthat the experiment contained 16 high pairs of subjects, 16 medium pairs, and 16 low pairsof subjects for a total of, again, 48 pairs. Of the 48 pairs, 68.75% (33 out of 48) reachedan agreement on the division of the 10-point allotment. Of the 48 pairs, 34 began witha 2-point offer and 14 with a 7-point offer. In those pairs that began the game with a2-point offer, 64.7% (22 out of 34) reached an agreement. In those pairs that began thegame with a 7-point offer, 78.6% (11 out of 14) reached an agreement. A summary of the
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basic statistics is provided in bullet points below.
• 96 total players
• 48 pairs of players
– 16 High Trait Pairs
– 16 Medium Trait Pairs
– 16 Low Trait Pairs
• 33 Pairs Reached an Agreement
– 22 from 2 point offers
– 11 from 7 point offers
• 15 Pairs Did Not Reach an Agreement
– 12 from 2 point offers
– 3 from 7 point offers
For each subject, the aggression level was estimated using just the aggression measurediscussed above, but only the reactive questions were included which created a possiblerange between 0–22. The mean for the entire sample was 7.2 which is consistent withother samples using the same aggression measuring instrument (Raine et. al., 2006).14
14For the Reactive–Proactive Aggression Questionnaire the mean scores for reactive aggression in mixed-sex samples is generally found to be in the 6.5 –7.5 range (Raine et al., 2006). It should also be notedthat although there were 47 Male and 49 Female subjects, no significant sex differences were found in theaggression scores or in the game results. Initially this was quite surprising and not what I expected. It is,however, consistent with several other studies on aggression and sex. For example, Hyde (1984) finds inher meta-study that median difference for sex (she calls this gender) in 143 different aggression studies wasaround 5%, and that differences are even smaller when aggression is measured by self-report (as done here).She also finds that in studies that use just college students (again as done here) the median differencesfalls to 1%. Overall, her results indicate that little aggression variance is due to sex differences. In addition,Bettencourt & Miller (1996) find that almost all sex differences evaporate in experimental studies thatinvolve economic games. These results are also very similar to studies of aggression and sex by Hyde
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As predicted, Player A subjects who made a 2-point offer had significantly higher levelsof trait aggression than those Player A subjects who made a 7-point offer. As Fig 1.1indicates, the 34 subjects who made the 2-point first-round offer (N = 34) had a meanaggression score of 8.4, compared with a mean score of 5.6 for the 14 subjects who madethe 7-point offer (N = 14). The difference between the two mean scores is statisticallysignificant at the 95% confidence level using a one-tailed Difference of Means T-Test (p<0.04). This result supports the first measure of the Aggression Hypothesis in section4.2.1. Trait aggression does indeed predict a more hostile opening move in the game
Figure 4.1: A Player A Offers
In addition, the subjects who rejected the low (2-point) ultimatum game offers had signifi-cantly higher levels of trait aggression than those who accepted. As Figure 4.2 indicates,the 12 subjects who rejected the offer (N = 12) had a mean aggression score of 9.7, versus
(2005) and Feingold (1994). Finally, the lack of sex differences in my aggression scores and game resultsmay also be a consequence of pre-experiment selection. For instance, highly aggressive men might be lesslikely to go to college than highly aggressive women which may equalize aggression in the sample. Orperhaps the fact that all subjects came from political science courses may also select in or out aggressiveindividuals along sex lines.
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a mean score of 5.6 for those 22 who accepted (N = 22). Again, the difference betweenthe mean scores is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level using a one-tailedDifference of Means T-test (p <0.00). This result supports the second measurement of theAggression Hypothesis in section 4.2.1. As predicted, subjects who made and rejected thelow ultimatum game offers (2 out of 10 points) had significantly higher aggression levelsthan those who made the higher offer or accepted the low offer.
Figure 4.2: Low Offer Responses
Results in this Chapter indicate that aggression is correlated with higher levels of re-jection and higher initial offers in an ultimatum game. This finding shows that traitaggression, at least in part, plays a role in negative reciprocity in an experimental en-vironment constructed to make both negative (but not positive) reciprocity possible. It isimportant to note that in games or events where more interaction is possible the role oftrait aggression could change. It is possible, for example, that subjects who punish theirpartner by refusing low offers could develop negative reputations and may, therefore,alter their behavior as a consequence. The results presented here are consistent with
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similar work by Burnham (2007) on testosterone-level differences and with the resultsof Sanfey et al. (2003) who finds increased neural activation in subjects who reject lowultimatum game offers.
As predicted, the groups of players also varied in their propensity to reach an agreement.The groups, however, did not vary in the manner predicted. As Table 4.1 illustrates, pairswith two high-trait aggressive individuals reached an agreement in 62.5% of the games(10 out of 16) while pairs who contained two low-trait aggressive individuals reached anagreement in 56.3% of the games (9 out of 16). Medium-aggression pairs had the highestlevel of accord with 87.5% of the games (14 out of 16) reaching an agreement. This resultdoes not support the third measure of the Aggression Hypothesis in section 4.2.1. Whileit is impossible to definitively know, it is likely that this null result is due to a lack ofplayer interaction. The experiment was a one-shot game with each player only makingone decision. This design limits the ability of any pair structure to produce reliable data.In an iterated game setting it is quite possible the result would be different as pairs ofhigh aggressive individuals interact over multiple rounds.
Table 4.1: Agreement ReachedHigh Aggression Pairs 62.5%Medium Aggression Pairs 87.5%Low Aggression Pairs 56.3%Note: There were 16 pairs in each group
4.3.1 Skin Conductance Level Results
SCL was measured during a 3-minute baseline period while the subjects watched a calm-ing video and for an approximately 7-minute baseline period while the subjects read thegame instructions and asked relevant questions. The measurement device was placed on
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the inside wrist of the subject’s non-dominant hand. The SCL device measured skin con-ductance using a constant (0.5V) voltage which was converted to a time-series data formatat a rate of 32 readings per second. Values of the skin conductance were transformed intomicrosiemens values using software provided by the Affectiva Company. Microsiemensare a unit of electric conductance. Averages (expressed in microsiemens) for SCL duringthe two baseline periods and game period were calculated. The two baseline periodswere combined to create an average SCL baseline. SCL differences during the game, andtherefore during a decision, were obtained by subtracting the SCL baseline from the SCLwhile the game was being conducted. SCL data were not available for four of the subjectsbecause of device failure over a large portion of one or more of the measured time zones.These subjects were excluded from the SCL results, therefore, the number of subjects withSCL results is 92.15
Mean SCL rates for the video, instruction and game periods for all subjects are shownin Table 4.2. As predicted, subjects with the high levels of trait aggression had greaterincreases from their baseline levels in ski conductance levels when compared to subjectswith medium or low levels of trait aggression. As the red highlighted cells in Table 4.2indicate, only the subjects in the high-aggressive category showed a significant differencebetween their levels during the combined baseline measurements and the measurementstaken during the game (p <0.05). This finding supports the SCL hypothesis and indi-cates that high-aggressive individuals do cognate with more emotion than medium- orlow-aggressive individuals. This finding is consistent with prior work demonstrating in-creased neural activation with low-ultimatum game offers and all ultimatum rejections(Stanfey et al., 2003). In this article the authors argue that evolved psychology mecha-
15Note here that my SCL results show no influence of sex on autonomic emotional responsiveness mea-sured by SCLs. This is consistent with most studies using skin conductance including Bradley et al. (2001),Mardaga, Laloyaux, &Hansenne (2006), and Mardaga & Hansenne (2015). This does not fully suggestthat sex has no influence on emotional responsiveness but instead that the influence might depend uponstimulus characteristics that a simple economic game does not reveal.
90
nisms designed to create reciprocal altruism also create emotional responses to unequaldivisions. A discussion on the implications for these results and future follow-up studiesare offered in the next section.
Table 4.2: Mean SCL Rates by Aggression Category
Video Instructions Weighted Avg Game p T-Test
All 6.871442 6.870518 6.870920 8.036438 0.28 1.085N = 92High 6.826896 6.824552 6.825724 9.951484 0.04 2.07N = 31Medium 8.942759 8.942597 8.942678 9.158281 0.92 0.097N = 32Low 4.479566 4.479316 4.479441 4.594036 0.94 0.076N = 29
Note: The p and T-Test values were obtained via one-sided T-Test on the entire sample of subjects in each category not the means as reported in the table.
Note: All values in columns 1-4 are reported in microsiemens.
4.4 Discussion
In this chapter, I address one main question: Is there variation in the decision-makingprocess between high-aggressive individuals and low-aggressive individuals? In Chapter3, I find that high-trait aggression is likely to be present in individuals who voluntarilyjoin a rebel group, which necessitates the follow-up question of: so what? Understandingthe differences in how high-aggressive individuals and low-aggressive individuals makedecisions is part of the answer to that question and is also, therefore, likely to havepolicy-relevant implications. This chapter aims to clarify that high-trait aggressive indi-viduals do in fact make different decisions compared to low-trait aggressive individuals.The major findings reported here are that higher levels of trait aggression correlate withthe willingness to make offers that are seemingly unfair and the willingness to forgo ben-
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efits in order to punish playing partners.
Furthermore, I provide evidence that high-trait aggressive individuals also show increasedneural activation in areas of the brain associated with System I decision-making com-pared to low-trait aggressive individuals. The takeaway conclusions from these findingsare that incorporating an understanding of individual-level preferences generated by per-sonality variation is the next step in models of rebel joining and rebel behavior. In thepast, conflict scholars have largely ignored the individual, but the findings of this chapterand the previous indicate that individual-level variations exist in rebel groups and thatthese variations matter during decision-making. In addition, the findings in Chapters3 and 4 indicated that we can and should incorporate individual-level preferences intorational-choice models and that we can do so without being tautological.
There are a number of ways this work can be extended that are likely to be worthwhile.First, correlations between testosterone and trait aggression are quite high. The findingsreported here are encouraging for researchers who are interested in how levels of testos-terone alter negotiations, but lack the ability to easily test testosterone levels. Surveytrait-aggression measures are both reliable and valid even in subjects with a history ofviolent actions, as shown in Chapter 3, and an interesting follow-up study would be toexamine trait aggression and ultimatum game play in populations of former rebels, espe-cially if pre-survey indicators on their willingness to rejoin the group or reintegrate backinto society were also obtained.
Second, an obvious extension would be studying aggression in other games importantfor conflict studies, such as the ‘dictator game’, ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, ‘public goods game’,or the ‘trust game’. Using trait aggression is novel for conflict research but previouswork has been concerned with the origins and consequences of aggressive behaviors.
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For example, McDermott et al. (2009) found that the presence of the MAOA-L gene –sometimes referred to as the ‘warrior gene’ or ‘violence gene’ – predicted aggressive be-haviors in ultimatum and trust games, but the researchers were also left wondering “howand why individual genetic differences cause different behavioral outcomes” and “whatmight be the underlying psychological phenomena at work?” (p.2,121). In this experi-ment, I find evidence that the process questioned by McDermott et al. probably worksthrough individual differences on trait aggression (and probably other personality traits).Although the results suggest that trait aggression plays a role in a scenario similar tothose witnessed in wartime, a major question remains as to how and why these indi-vidual differences affect group-level behavior. In other words, what might be the effectof trait aggression on decisions in a group with a disproportionately large number ofhighly aggressive individuals? Groups of aggressive individuals probably act differentlythan groups with a mixture of trait-aggression levels, but exactly how this process worksand in what magnitude is unclear. The aggressive behavior of groups may simple be aresult of an additive process compiling all the individuals together or, perhaps, a spiral-ing circle of aggression occurs. More research on the individual-to-group-level transitionis needed, and all these questions are ripe for future research in both the lab and the field.
Third, some recent work in behavioral economics has shown an increase in levels of gen-erosity in players of economic games who meet face-to-face before play begins. It is quitepossible that this increase is moderated by levels of aggression or other personality traits.If, however, high-trait aggression individuals increase levels of generosity from pregameface-to-face interaction then this is a clear example of how this avenue of research canbecome policy relevant. For example, if in subsequent experiments I discover that high-trait aggressive individuals are most likely to come to an agreement following pregameinteraction then I can recommend to practitioners that conflict negotiations begin withsocial interactions that do not directly address the conflict.
93
Finally, this work has been largely exploratory, meaning the application of personality toconflict is just beginning. I choose the ultimatum game to create a clean decision frame-work so results would be easily interpreted and their applications clear. In addition, Ilimited the analysis to trait aggression only so that the results would relate to the avail-able data and analysis in Chapter 3. There are, however, several additional relationshipsthat need to be tested, such as how the results change in an iterated game and how,what role additional personality traits play, and if high-aggressive individuals cope fortheir initial performance with different strategies in other interactions.
In this chapter, I have demonstrated that decisions which refute economic-utility theoryare influenced by the presence of high-trait aggression. Accounting for characteristicsof individuals means that additional forces are at play alongside economic utility whenpeople make decisions. Rational-choice research as applied to conflict studies has yet toserious embrace this type of thinking because variation of this type forces a reconsidera-tion of the concept of utility. If this variation is contained, even partially, in a systematicand measurable concept like personality, however, then accounting for personality meansbeing able to better model the actual preferences of sorted groups such as rebels. It ismy hope that the findings in this chapter and the previous one will encourage scholarsto broaden their view on using rational-choice models to understand rebellion. Person-ality traits even exert an influence in purely economic games and this should give usconfidence about the importance of individual psychological variation in understandingdecision-making. The results of this chapter are an early step in that process, but muchmore work is necessary to fully understand the role of personality in rebellions.
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Chapter 5Military Enlistment
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 all address the decision to join a rebel group in one form or an-other. Even though these results are limited to only trait aggression, they do show theutility of studying personality traits in conflict research. To some, these findings mayemphasize the importance of studying personality only in the context of rebellion, whileto others, the decision to join a rebellion may simply be fundamentally different thanstudying other conflict related topics. The goal of this chapter is to dispel those notionsand to demonstrate that studying personality traits is important for a variety of differenttopics conflict scholars are trying to understand. In this chapter, I, therefore, turn awayfrom rebel groups and civil conflict and instead examine whether personality traits canalso be a reliable predictor of voluntary enlistment in a traditional state military.
Similar to the study of rebellion, the question of ‘why do some individuals decide to enlistin the military while others do not’ has received some general empirical research. Thisresearch has focused, again like that of rebellion, on the role that family backgroundand external socio-economic factors have on enlisting. The results of these studies haverevealed a plethora of variables that predict enlisting in the military. These include sex,high-school grades, race, parental income, general education levels, and antisocial be-havior (Bachman et al., 2000; Gibson, Griepentrog & Marsh, 2007; Jackson et al., 2012;Segal et al., 1999; Beaver et al., 2015).
At least since Janowitz’s work (1960) there has been ongoing debate particularly about
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who joins the U.S. Armed Forces, which switched from a mixture of volunteer and con-scription (drafted) personnel to an all-volunteer force in 1973. Therefore, questions aboutthe enlistment of young people have arisen particularly focused on the circumstances andcharacteristics of enlistees and why some young Americans enlist in the military ratherthan attend college or seek a non-military job.
The current levels of U.S. military service personnel, about 1.2 million, means that about200,000 new enlistees are needed each year just to maintain a stable active-duty force.Recruitment is further hindered by youth seeking higher education and civilian job op-portunities and the seemingly continuous warfare of the past 15 years that may deterwould-be recruits from joining. In fact, since 1973, recruiting has been easiest duringpeaceful times of economic downturn (Eighmey, 2006). Nevertheless, the U.S. militaryhas routinely met its enlistment goals even though American youth have shown an in-creasingly downward trend in their propensity to volunteer for military service (Woodruff,Kelty & Segal, 2006). Two recent studies of youth enlistment in the military have revealeda set of motives cited by the enlistees themselves: economic factors, service to country,escape from current situation, adventure, opportunity for travel, self-improvement, andmoney for education (Eighmey, 2006; Bachman et al. 2000). In addition, and perhaps un-surprisingly, a desire to serve the country expressed during high school has been shownto be a particularly strong predictor of actual enlistment after graduation (Woodruff, Kelty& Segal, 2006).
What little work that does directly assess personality traits in traditional militaries fo-cuses on actual commanders or those predicted to be a leader. This research generallyfalls into two categories: 1) attempts to identify which traits create leaders instead offollowers; or 2) attempts to understand the traits that lead to successful leadership asopposed to unsuccessful leadership (Yukl, 1992; Hunt, 1985; Hogan, Curphy, & Hogan,
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1994; Lillibridge & Williams, 1992). Like a lot of early personality work, this work ishampered by theoretical limitations resulting from a lack of a standard conceptualizationof personality. Traits in these studies were often given different labels even though theywere ascribed to the same or similar observations. Relatively recently, however, the riseof the five-factor model (FFM) has given military leadership research a stable taxonomyfor understanding the role of personality.1
Using a sample of 1,261 German adolescents and a multi-Wave survey, for example, Jack-son et al. (2012) find that low levels of three personality traits (agreeableness, neuroti-cism, and openness to experience) predict choosing military service over civilian service.These findings, however, are a byproduct of the paper’s main goal – which is to under-stand how military service alters personality traits rather than the other way around –because a baseline level of traits were a necessary component of their modeling proce-dure. In addition, Beaver et al. (2015) find that genetic similarity also correlates withself-selecting into the U.S. military using a twin-based study of adolescents. Beaver etal. (2015) also note, on p. 2, that their genetic findings most likely exert their influencethrough individual-level traits like personality. Even with this wide range of researcha significant proportion of variance in military enlistment remains unexplored or under-explored.
5.1 The FFM and Enlistment
Over the past twenty-five years, personality psychologists have reached a consensusthat most of a person’s personality can be summarized by what is called the Big Five
1The legitimacy and consistency of the FFM has been supported by numerous studies in a variety offields. For a good summary of the model see Costa & McCrae (2008), Digman (1990) and McCrae & Costa(1990).
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personality traits (McCrae & Costa, 1997; McCrae et al., 2005). Described in Table 5.1these five personality traits are openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion,agreeableness, and neuroticism. Openness to experience is related to having and wantinga complex mental and experiential life (John, Naumann and Soto, 2008). Conscientious-ness is related to having a high degree of control over impulsive behavior and being atask-oriented person. Extraversion is related to positive emotionality about the worldand seeking out new experiences. Agreeableness describes a communal or prosocial ori-entation. Finally, neuroticism, sometimes referred to, although with an inverted scale, as‘emotional stability’, can be thought of as ’nervousness’ or ‘tenseness’ and particularly as’emotional’. Each of these traits are generally measured using a set of scaled questionsthat produce varying but stable readings on each individual – i.e. Jane is high on neu-roticism, and low on conscientiousness.2
The Big Five personality model have a long history that dates back to at least the 1940’sand Raymond Cattell’s sixteen factor model for normal personalities (Cattell, 1946). Thecurrently Five Factor model (FFM) is most notably associated with the joint work ofRobert McCrae and Paul Costa beginning with their reintroduction of the model in 1985(McCrae & Costa, 1985). McCrae and Costa have both established the stability of thefive factors from childhood to adolescence and on to adulthood and established that thefive factor model is transferable to most, if not all, cultures around the globe (Costa &McCrae, 1994; McCrae & Costa, 2008). In fact, it is not out of bounds to say the modernuse of personality traits in psychology research is based around adding or subtractingdifferent traits to the Five Factor model depending on the researcher’s particular question.
In this chapter, I examine what personality traits lead some young men to choose military
2The FFM of personality was not included in the analysis of Chapter 3 because no FFM questions wereasked in the GAGS or North Kivu surveys. It is included in this chapter because questions are available forU.S. Military Enlistment and I also plan on including FFM questions in future projects examining personalityand rebels (see section 6.4 for a description on these plans.
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Table 5.1: The Five-Factor Model of Personality.
Trait DescriptionNeuroticism Related to anxiety and opposite of emotionally stableExtraversion Associated with enthusiasm toward life’s circumstances or outgoingOpenness to experience Associated with the willingness to have new experiences or new ideas
Agreeableness Related to an inclination toward submission to others and subduednessConscientiousness Related to being reliable and responsibleNote: Descriptions developed from Digman (1990).
service and some do not. That question is analyzed using a cross-sectional and longitu-dinal panel survey dataset obtained from a large nationwide sample of youths from theUnited States.
5.2 Research Design
In this chapter, I employ the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (AddHealth) dataset which is widely used in multiple social-science disciplines. The datasetis a longitudinal study with multiple waves beginning in 1994. The researchers usedin-home, in-school, and school-administrator questionnaires and interviewed adolescentsin Grades 7 through 12 during the initial wave, followed by three additional waves withthe last conducted in 2008.3 The first wave of the study selected 80 high schools from aframe of over 26,000 possible schools. The schools were not chosen at random and wereinstead selected based on size, census region, urbanization, and percent of white stu-dents. Participating high schools were then asked to self-identify the junior high schoolsthat served as their feeder schools. From this list an additional 65 schools were added,making a total of 145 junior high and high schools. An initial sample of over 20,000 ado-lescents were drawn from these schools, comprising of a core of 12,105 randomly selected
3Wave 5 is scheduled to be implemented sometime between 2016 and 2018.
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students plus several oversampled sub-groupings. The survey, to date, has produced fourwaves of interviews. Wave 1 was the original 45-minute questionnaire. Wave 2 (1996)consisted of a set of in-home interviews with 14,738 students from the Wave 1 sample.Wave 3 (2001-2002) consisted of in-home interviews of 15,170 students from Wave 1 andwas the first time any military-enlistment questions were asked. Finally, Wave 4 (2008)consisted of an in-home interview with 15,701 participants from the Wave 1 sample andalso included military-enlistment questions.
The relevant waves for this analysis are Wave 1 (personality data) and Wave 4 (militaryenlistment data).4 The Add Health survey consisted of a nationally representative sam-ple of youth from the United States. Of the 20,745, Wave 1 respondents, approximately54% self-identified Caucasian, 19% were African-American, 16% were Hispanic, 7% wereAsian-American, and 3.5% were Native American, with the remaining participants notidentifying their race. The approximate ratio of race representation was maintained inWave 4, but the number of respondents dropped to 15,701, ranging from 24 to 32 yearsin age (Harris et al., 2009). Information about the data, samples, and subsamples canbe found at http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth. In addition, Resnick et al.(1997) provide details on the sampling procedures used to collect the original Wave 1 data.
5.2.1 Data
Using the subjects interviewed in Wave 4, which by necessity were also included in Wave1, I began with a total of 15,701 subjects. The drop from 20,745 subjects in Wave 1 to15,701 subjects in Wave 4 is due to normal attrition rates including the death of subjects,inability to locate subjects, and unresponsiveness of subjects. Restricting the data to
4Although military-enlistment questions were asked in Wave 3, I chose to use the enlistment data fromWave 4 because it allowed the subjects another 6-7 years to choose to enlist.
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only males with non-missing information on both the dependent and independent mea-sures of interest, as well as those who were eligible for military service (i.e. those whofit the cognitive and physical abilities and criminal backgrounds accepted by the U.S.military) left a total of 6,971 subjects. The exclusion criteria for those “fit” for militaryservice was taken from Beaver et al. (2015) and includes scores on cognitive aptitudetests (to meet minimal intelligence standards) and body-mass indices (to meet minimumphysical-fitness standards). I also chose to exclude female subjects because while moreand more women are entering the armed forces, the military is still dominated by males.In addition, Bachman et al. (2000) and Murray and McDonald (1999) find that, while sim-ilar in kind, female and male enlistments have different socio-demographic correlations(suggested by Elder et al., 2010). Consequently, because socio-demographic variablesalso align with personality traits, women were excluded from the study.
Table 5.2 offers the basic descriptive statistics for subjects who enlisted in the militaryand those who did not. Of the 6,971 male subjects fit for military service, 714 (10.24%)voluntarily enlisted.5 In addition, to the dependent and independent variables describedbelow, I also include the subject’s race and parental education level. Each of these twofactors as been found in previous studies to be a significant predictor of enlistment aswell as highly correlated with other predictors of enlistment (i.e. number of parents,household size, income level, etc.). As Table 5.2 shows, the two samples are relativelyequal on the race variables with the military sample having a small increase in only theblack and Hispanic rows. In addition, the military enlistment sample also shows a higherpercentage of adolescents whose parents have a college degree. This increase is causedby the removal of subjects based on the “fit” criteria which sharply favors subjects whoseparents only have a high school or less education level.
5This is similar to other U.S. studies that find that among eligible males approximately 10% enlist insome branch of the Armed Forces (Elder et al., 2010).
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics for Demographic Data (N = 6, 971)Non-Military (n = 6,257) Military (n = 714)N % N %Race/EthnicityWhite 3288 52.55 339 47.48Black 1220 19.50 171 23.95Asian 416 6.65 42 5.88Hispanic 1021 16.31 134 18.77
Parent EducationHS or Less 3047 48.78 304 43.30College or More 3201 51.22 398 56.70
Note: 312 (4.99%) Non-Military and 28 (3.89%) Military subjects did not list race/ethnicityNote: The Non-Military Parent Education variables contain 9 missing entriesNote: The Military Parent Education variables contain 12 missing entries
5.2.1.1 Dependent Variable
Military service was measured via a dichotomous variable that represented whether arespondent had ever served in the military. This question was asked during the Wave4 interviews in 2008. If the respondent indicated she had ever been in the military (allbranches including the Coast Guard) a value of “1” was assigned, otherwise the respon-dent was given a value of “0”. In addition, subjects who were unavailable for interviewsbecause they were deployed on active military duty during Wave 4 were also assigned avalue of “1”. By the fourth wave in 2008, 714 subjects of the 6,947-subject sample, 10.28%,had served or were serving in the U.S. Armed Forces. Included in the 714 subjects weresome subjects who served in the Reserves or National Guard, but this sub-group ac-counted for only 14 percent (100 out of 714) of the total service members.6
In addition to being contemporary and ongoing, there are two major advantages in using
6As a robustness check all models were run with and without the Reservist or National Guard membersand no significant differences were observed.
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Add Health to study personality and enlistment. First, Add Health has been used in sev-eral other studies, with Elder et al. (2010) being the most relevant, to examine what socialmeasures correlate with enlistment. This information allows me to include their relevantfindings in understanding the role of personality and, therefore, to further minimize theconfounding variables. Second, the data cover a considerable period of time after the ageof 18 which allow the subjects ample time to enlist other than immediately out of highschool. Previous studies on enlistment in traditional military, with or without personality,have tended to focus on enlistment directly after finishing high school. This can lead toincomplete findings as people often enlist well into their early 20s. In fact, Woodruff,Kelty & Segal (2006) show that the peak years for enlistment in the U.S. Armed Forcesare between 18 to 24 with a significant drop-off in enlistment rates starting around age25. At the time of Wave 4 interviews, all of the subjects had passed or almost passed thispeak time, being aged 24-32.
One significant flaw in using Add Health, however, is that the survey does not containtiming information for military enlistment. This means there is no way to determinewhether subjects entered the military before or after college and, therefore, to determineif they entered as an enlisted personnel or a commissioned officer. A significant numberof respondents do list both attending college and enlisting in the military (N = 274).Attending college and entering the military are related because most U.S. Military of-ficers come from college Reserves Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs and collegegraduates who are not in ROTC are still more likely to attend officer training schoolonce in the military. Therefore, it is likely that some ROTC and other service academymembers are included in the data. Overall, however, the number of military officers inAdd Health is probably small (less than 50 based on age of the respondent) because alarge number of the respondents also list “paying for college” as one of the reasons forenlisting. Because the data are unreliable or unavailable, I draw no differences between
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enlistees and officers but I also do not expect the small number of officers in the sampleto significantly change the results.
5.2.1.2 Independent Variables
5.2.1.2.1 NEO Originally designed to collect data on the physical and mental health ofsubjects and their families, the early Waves of Add Health did not include direct measuresof personality traits. Instead, Add Health was originally designed to investigate how in-dividual factors and social context influence adolescent and early-adulthood health andrisk behaviors. For this reason, Wave 1 questions were primarily related to the physicaland mental health, interpersonal relationships, risky behaviors, delinquency, and educa-tion of the subjects. In addition, questions about the subject’s environments – home, workand school – were also asked.
To facilitate the use of such an extensive survey in studying personality, however, Young& Beaujean (2011) developed a measure of the Big-5 personality traits from questionsthat were asked in the initial interviews. For a complete examination of how they accom-plished this, see Young & Beaujean (2011) directly, however, I would like to note that theirreliability estimates (alpha scores) are all above .75 which is consistent with the scoresof typical personality instruments. To determine if any of the Add Health questions hada lexical design similar to a FFM questionnaire, Young & Beaujen (2011) matched thequestions against the often-used NEO Personality Inventory-Revised (NEO-PI-R); (Costa& McCrae, 1992). Their findings indicate that 13 items from Wave 1, each measured in a9-point Likert scale, could proxy well for a Big-5 instrument. These questions, however,only provided information on 3 of the 5 traits – neuroticism (6 items), extraversion (3items), and conscientiousness (4 items).
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In addition, Add Health directly employed a 20-item IPIP survey developed by Donnellanet al. (2006) during Wave 4 in 2008. This was performed on all the Wave 4 subjects(i.e. the 15,701 subjects remaining from Wave 1). While using results from the Wave 4questions to predict answers to military-enlistment questions, which were only askedin Wave 3 and Wave 4, is tautologically problematic, Young & Beaujean (2011) do offercomparisons between their measures of the Big-5 traits and those directly measured inWave 4. These comparisons show high levels of correlation and the predicted direction-ality with their measures from the Wave 1 questions. In the analysis below I follow theiradvice and employ personality measures from Wave 1 on only neuroticism, extraversion,and conscientiousness.
5.2.1.2.2 Aggression A measure of aggression was also extracted from the Add Healthdataset. The aggression variable was created using a four-item scale of self-reported ag-gressive behavior. The scale was computed using the frequency with which the subjectsengaged in the following behaviors in the past year; 1) got into a serious physical fight;2) hurt someone badly; 3) used or threatened to use a weapon; and 4) took part in agang fight. The responses were scored using a range from 0 (never) to 3 (five times ormore). Items were averaged to create a score for each respondent (alpha =.75).7 To beclear, this is not measuring the same “trait-aggression” concept as discussed in Chapters3 and 4, but it can give an indication of the relationship between aggression and enlisting.
7This measure is identical to the one created by Row, Almeida, & Jacobson (1999) although they onlyemployed it on the sample of biologically related individuals contained in Wave 1 of Add Health.
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5.3 Results
The main model of this chapter employs a Probit regression on the dichotomous enlist-ment variable, where any enlistment receives a score of “1” and all other observationsa “0”. In Wave 1 of the Add Health survey the main sub-samples identified and over-sampled were pairs of siblings. This included all twin pairs, full siblings, half-siblings,and unrelated siblings raised in the same household. The main purpose of this designis to allow for the comparison of siblings while holding the home environment constant,therefore, reducing the potential omitted-variable bias in studying the relationship be-tween personality and any behavior. Including this in the data is also a powerful way toaccount for biological causation in studying any behavior and the sibling-pairs sampleis similar in demographic composition to the full Add Health sample (Jacobson & Rowe,1998). In fact, as I stated above, Beaver et al. (2015) utilize the sibling data to find asmuch as 82% of the variance in lifetime-military service results from genetic components.8The structure of this data, however, also means the observations are non-independent.To account for this non-independence and following the advice of De Neve (2015), I clus-ter on the standard errors on siblings to better account for non-independent observations.
Based on the discussion of aggression in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, it is expected that aggres-sion will be strongly associated with enlistment. In addition, based on the description ofthe personality traits provided above in this chapter and previous work on personality andbehavior, it is also expected that extraversion will be strongly associated with enlistmentand that neuroticism will be associated with non-enlistment. Results of this analysis arepresented in Table 5.3 and they corroborate the expectations in the case of aggressionand extraversion. In the case of neuroticism, however, an association with lower lev-els and enlistment is found. Table 5.3 also illustrates an extension of the findings andarguments from Chapters 2-4 in the results of the model. The results indicated that ag-
8Note that this is lifetime-military service and not simply the initial decision to enlist.
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gression significantly predicts enlisting in the U.S. Armed Forces (p <0.000). Additionally,in corroborating and extending the findings on the Big-5 in psychology, the results alsoindicate that extraversion significantly predicts enlisting (p <0.000) and that neuroticismis significantly related to not-enlisting (negative coefficient) in the U.S. Armed Forces (p<0.03). Openness, however, does not produce a significant effect of enlisting, althoughit is in the predicted direction. Adolescents who eventually enlisted in the military wereoverall more aggressive, more extroverted, and less neurotic than their non-enlisted coun-terparts. These results suggest that personality traits do play a moderate but significantrole in the decision to enlist in the U.S. military. Similar to previous studies, black andhispanic males were more likely to join the military. According to Woodruff, Kelty & Segal(2006), the increased percentage of black and hispanic enlistment is due to a failure ofa larger percentage of black and hispanic males to qualify for military enlistment. Insimpler terms, a larger percentage of black and hispanic males are removed from thesample due to the “fit” criteria than white or asian males. The remaining significantresults in the sample, therefore, probably represent a selection bias process and not atrue increased likelihood of black and hispanic males enlisting in the military. Finally,parental education was found to be a negative predictor of enlistment suggesting thatadolescents whose parents have college degrees are less likely to enlist.
5.4 Discussion
An increasing body of literature and evidence suggests that there are inherent differencesbetween those individuals who voluntarily choose to join military units and those whodo not (Bachman et al., 2000; Gibson, Griepentrog & Marsh, 2007; Jackson et al., 2012;Segal et al., 1999; Beaver et al., 2015). However, with the exception of Jackson et al.(2012), this research fails to account for personality traits being one of those differences.The study reported in this chapter is, therefore, among the first to examine the relation
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Table 5.3: Probit Model of Enlistment on Personality and Control Variables (N = 6, 971)
EnlistmentCoef. SE p-value
Neuroticism -0.013 0.002 0.024Extraversion 0.012 0.002 0.000Openness -0.035 0.003 0.104Aggression 0.065 0.003 0.000
White -0.01 0.074 0.129Black 0.103 0.068 0.000Asian -0.040 0.081 0.289Hispanic 0.074 0.020 0.014Parent Edu -0.035 0.004 0.080Intercept - 2.648 0.294 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.12
between personality and military enlistment. The data confirm that personality variationdoes play a role in enlisting in the military. For example, if we were examine two indi-viduals from the same race, both with parents with high-school education, then accordingto the results, the individual with a higher level of aggression and extraversion wouldbe more likely to enlist in the military. The Add Health data provides an opportunity toinclude personality in the study of enlistment. The findings that more extraversion andless neuroticism predict enlistment is similar to Jackson et al. (2012). The findings onaggression, however, are novel. Neither Jackson et al. (2012), or any other literature Iam aware of, directly tests a measure of aggression and joining the U.S. military.
Higher levels of aggression and extraversion are likely to be especially beneficial in a mil-itary context. For example, aggressive behavior is associated with the training of soldiers(i.e., weapon training, combat tactics, etc.) and high levels of aggression may improve
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the performance of recruits. In addition, high levels of aggression have also been shown,unsurprisingly, to correlate with quick aggressive decisions when primed with aggressivecues (Meier, Robinson, & Wilkowski, 2006). Therefore, individuals who are high on theaggression scale may react quicker and with more force in life-or-death situations. Ob-viously this is, however, a monotone view of the role of military personnel. It may be thatofficers have less need for quick aggressive behavior or that enlistees have higher levelsof aggression than officers. This level of nuance is unavailable from the available AddHealth data, but it is ripe for further exploration.
Finally, in high-school youths, other studies have shown that prior attitudes or beliefsabout “serving my country” and the “role of the military” can accurately predict enlistment.(Woodruff, Kelty & Segal, 2006). Yet, we also know that attitudes and beliefs, particularlythose about the role of government, are also heavily influenced by personality traits(Mondak, 2010). The analysis above leads me to conclude that, like most other behaviors,prior findings about the attitudes or beliefs of enlistees are partially driven by differencesin personality. According to the results individuals with high levels of aggression, highextraversion and low neuroticism are likely to enlist, but, while it isn’t testable usingthe Add Health data, I also contend that that those same traits highly correlate withattitudes or beliefs about “serving my country” and the “role of the military”. Enlistingin the military is a combination of external environmental factors and internal biologicalfactors. Personality, being a combination of both, therefore, probably operates by helpingto create positive attitudes about being in the military and beliefs about the proper roleof the military that Woodruff, Kelty & Segal (2006) and others have observed.
5.4.1 Limitations and Future Research
Although this chapter uses a large and nationally representative sample, some limitationsshould be kept in mind while considering these findings. First, despite the size of Add
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Health data, some concerns about the generalizability of these results remain. It is possi-ble that in other countries or in other militaries, different personality traits better predictenlistment, or that in a military with a higher degree of casualties personality play adifferent role. Or even that in some other context, although unlikely, personality doesnot predict enlistment. Second, the U.S. Armed Forces is an all-volunteer force, while incountries with conscription, selection effects may enhance or mitigate the role of person-ality. Third, the above analysis excludes agreeableness and conscientiousness becauseof data unavailability. It is entirely probable and even likely that both of these excludedtraits play a role in enlistment and, in fact, Jackson et al. (2012) find a high correlationbetween low agreeableness and non-enlistment in the German military.9. Finally, theU .S. military is a vast institution with significant job variation. The role of personalityin enlistment is probably heavily contingent on the type of military specialization theindividual envisions. Future research should focus on understanding the variation in thepersonalities that self-select into different types of military specialization. For example,those self-selecting into infantry units, particularly special operations, may be differentthan those selecting into non-combat units.
9This finding does partially support my results as agreeableness is sometimes found to be inversely re-lated to aggression. Therefore, finding high levels of aggression in enlistees is, at least partially, consistentwith finding low levels of agreeableness.
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Chapter 6Conclusion
Individual differences matter. They matter for understanding which people vote, whichpeople join political parties, and which people rebel. Individual differences are also ex-pressed – at least partially – in personality traits and, therefore, personality traits matter.Personality is formed by our genes and impacts the way we see and interact with theworld. We select organizations, environments, and behaviors – whether consciously orsubconsciously – because of our personality traits. The opportunity now exists for theinclusion of personality to benefit the study of rebellion and civil war. Part of that benefitis in developing a more comprehensive and more informative theory of which individualsrebel. In addition, understanding more about which individuals make up rebel groups andhow they behave will also help us understand and predict rebel group behavior.
At the beginning of this dissertation, I began with a hypothetical story of three friendsliving in Benghazi before the 2011 Libyan civil conflict – Abdoul, Bouba and Farag. Atthe end of that story I argued that the current theories of rebel-group participation couldnot adequately explain why the three friends, who were all of the same ethnic, religious,and economic groups, made different decisions about participating in the revolution. Thisdissertation has begun by telling us that the reasons they all made different decisionsis likely, at least partially, a result of internal personality variation between the threefriends. Bouba, the friend who joined the rebellion, would likely have a high level of traitaggressiveness, while his friends Abdoul and Farag do not.
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As conflict scholars we have done a solid job of observing civil wars and cataloging thecharacteristics of their onset, duration and termination (i.e. ethnic cleavages, mountain-ous terrain, third-party involved settlements), but that external variation can only takeus so far. A new agenda needs to take root that pays just as much attention to theinternal variation of those who actively participate in civil war. This dissertation is afirst step toward creating that new agenda and one that I hope is developed furtherby myself and others. In bringing personality to rebellion scholarship, I am not alone.Instead, I stand firmly on the shoulders of others, with one foot on the foundation laidby those who developed the concept of personality and its relationship to behavior, andthe other foot on the foundation laid by those who studied rebel group actors and actions.
As a subfield, conflict studies is ripe for the further application of findings from psychol-ogy, biology, and behavioral genetics. In the past, the study of conflict has been greatlyimproved by understanding how the structural dynamics of a state or region create orconstrain the choices of potential rebels. It is time, however, that we also understandthat interacting with those dynamics is heavily influenced by internal variation as well.Genetic variation resulting from evolution is part of what produces our behavioral out-puts. This variation is used to explain voter participation, public opinion, the behavior ofleaders, or political ideology, and it can also explain participation in war.
6.1 Summary of Dissertation
The three empirical chapters provide positive results regarding the correlation of highlevels of aggression and participation in conflict. The findings of each chapter, summa-rized below, suggest that individuals with high levels of trait aggression will volunteerfor combat more than those with low levels, and that they process and calculate the cost
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and benefits of decisions differently than their low-aggression counterparts.
6.1.1 Research Question and Theory
Chapter 1 introduced the major research question of this dissertation: Why do some peo-ple become rebels while others do not? In addition, the opening chapter began with ahypothetical example that illustrated how the major theories of rebel participation lackedan explanation of individual-level participation and outlined the contributions of this dis-sertation to the study of rebellion and civil war. Included in the contribution section wasa brief discussion on how specific conflict-related research could be improved with theinclusion of individual psychological variables.
Chapter 2 introduced a general explanation based on the theories and findings in political-participation research. This chapter began with an argument about the importance andrelevance of studying individuals in conflict. In this chapter, I also provided an overview ofpersonality and its evolutionary origins. In addition, I argued that, given ceteris paribus,personality-trait variation could be used to explain why some individuals choose to sup-port a rebellion by taking up arms and fighting and why others choose to support therebellion via moral or financial support. Finally, I clearly stated that this argument didnot imply that some “rebellious gene” or “rebellious trait” existed. Instead, the contentionlay simply in that some personality traits are likely to predict joining a rebel group be-cause those who possess certain traits see the actions of rebels as more appealing thanthose who do not.
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6.1.2 Empirical Results
The unique research design and analysis in Chapter 3 addresses the relationship betweenaggression and volunteering to be a rebel in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In thischapter I derived a single hypothesis that stated that higher-aggressive individuals wouldbe more likely to join the rebel group than lower-aggressive individuals. Trait aggressionwas explained and used to predict who joined because it influences the acceptance ofand desire for violent and risky behaviors. Before testing the hypothesis, I also explainedthat testing personality in a population of former combatants was problematic becauseof the effect conflict can likely have on trait levels. Therefore, I offered a research designthat used individuals who were abducted into a rebel group as a quasi-control group tocompare to volunteers. Next, I explained how this design provided significant leveragein testing personality-trait variation but also presented three distinct types of potentialbias. After systematically accounting for the potential biases a simply T-Test revealedthat aggression levels were indeed higher in volunteers than in abductees and providedsupport for the hypothesis. Overall, this chapter indicated that aggression does correlatewith the decision to join a rebel group and that more research on personality and rebel-lion is likely to produce worthwhile knowledge.
In Chapter 4, I examined how individuals who have high-trait aggression weigh cost andbenefits of decisions compared to individuals with low-trait aggression. This was doneusing an ultimatum game experiment conducted with a sample of undergraduate studentsfrom the United States. Using the logic of the game combined with previous research onaggression, I derived two hypotheses related to differences in game outcome and cog-nation styles between high- and low-trait aggression individuals. Next, I outlined theexperiment procedure, including an explanation of skin conductance measurement. Theresults from Chapter 4 indicated that high-aggressive individuals were both more likelyto make and reject low offers in the ultimatum game. Furthermore, I presented evidence
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that the average skin conductance level of high-trait aggressive individuals increasedsignificantly more than their low-trait counterparts. This indicated that the thinking process between the two groups also varied. Overall, this chapter produced positive resultsthat indicated that high-trait aggressive individuals do weigh the cost and benefits of adecision differently and that more research is warranted to fully understand how this islikely to influence the behavior of rebels and rebel groups.
In Chapter 5, I shifted focus away from rebellion and examined whether aggression andother personality traits also predicted joining a traditional all-volunteer state military, inthis case the U.S. Armed Forces. Using data from the extensive longitudinal Add Healthdataset, I examined three of the Big-5 personality traits – openness to experience, ex-traversion, and neuroticism – in addition to aggression to determine their correlationwith enlisting in the military. The analysis found that aggression and extraversion werepositively related to enlistment while neuroticism was negatively related. This confirmedthe hypotheses presented in the chapter and agreed with previous research on the Big-5 personality traits from Jackson et al. (2012) using voluntary German military enlistment.
6.2 Normative Implications
I believe that two distinct normative implications result from the discussion and analysisin this dissertation. I address each in kind here and provide a discussion as to why thisargument and, indeed, all personality research, are not deterministic.
For the social scientist who studies brain mechanisms, particularly aggressive ones, bothconceptual and ethical problems exist. Research that deals with the brain, evolution, andbrain-behavior linkage is like all social-science research in most respects but it is also
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differs in one key area. That key area is that the theories created, data collected, andcontentions derived help shape our idea of people themselves, their evolution, and eventhe limits of their successes and failures. Consequently, the first normative implicationsthat results from my dissertation is one of cultural determinism. All social scientists whouse biology to explain behavior must be wary of unconsciously making assumptions thatare not directly supported by the data. Instead, our arguments must focus on the re-ciprocal relationship between hypothesis and analysis. I hope the above argument andanalysis does this, but, if not, let me be clear now: aggression does not – not accordingto any of the evidence I present in this dissertation or any other evidence that I am awareof – exist more in one society, ethnic group, or region than any other. Often argumentsthat contend culture or ethnicity is more aggressive than another is simply based on ourflawed observations and not rigorously tested evidence.
My contention in this dissertation is not that certain groups of people or countries areinherently more aggressive than others, or inherently more war-prone than others. In-stead, what I believe the above analysis begins to illustrate, although much more workis necessary before “proof” exists, is that variation across individuals, which originatesin the genes, is present within all societies and can at least partially explain individualdifferences in participation. I do not think the evidence presented here or any evidence Ior someone else will collect later is likely to show that levels of aggression vary acrosscultures. Or that varying social levels of aggression can predict rebellion or civil war.Instead, what the argument above illustrates is that if a rebellion erupts, caused by someexternal factor or factors, some individuals are more likely to participate than others –regardless of what country or culture the rebellion takes place in.
The second normative implication from my dissertation is that understanding which indi-viduals within a society are likely to rebel before a rebellion occurs could allow for po-
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tentially ill-intended leaders (democratic or authoritarian) to remove the potential rebelsbeforehand. Indeed, this is probably both true and a distant future possibility. By ex-amining the personality traits that predict rebel joining and understanding more aboutwhich individuals are likely to join, research like that contained in this dissertation couldaid leaders in creating a system of identification that could weed out potential dissi-dents before they ever commit an action of rebellion. However, examining the biologicalunderpinnings of political behavior is just as likely to enhance the social good, whichis discussed in the next section, as it is to produce harm. Scholars should not ignoreor reject biological arguments that contain potential harm any more than they alreadyreject institutional arguments that do so. For example, we know that dictators are morelikely to survive in the short term, both politically and physically, if they use the militaryto combat political opposition, yet we still research dictators and their use of the mili-tary (Svolik, 2012). In any case, the best defense against misuse by leaders is increasedknowledge about the causes and consequences of political phenomena.
6.2.1 Why this Argument is Not Deterministic
The idea of using an internal variation, to the body, to explain an external variationwithout claiming a deterministic relationship is a complex one. It involves the idea ofreductionism, and the relationship between biological systems and physical acts. A per-son’s behavior can be, and should be, explained in terms of its causal antecedents. Toavoid teleological reasoning, however, causes (antecedents) and effects (behavior) shouldbe seen as distinct events. For instance, I have explained someone joining a rebel groupby using the relationship between his/her personality traits and argued that these traitscause the individual to have ’predispositions’ toward the behaviors likely found in rebelgroups. The causal factors (personality traits) remain distinct from the effects (joining arebel group) because ’predispositions’ imply increased probability of behaviors and not
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an absolute certainty of one or more behaviors occurring.
To clarify, imagine that a person is sentenced to anger-management class for starting abar fight. If we had pretested the individual’s personality traits and found high levels ofaggression, we could reasonably say, given the right environment, this person would bemore likely to start a bar fight. After anger-management classes, however, it is just asreasonable to say that the same person, in the exact same environment, is now less likelyto start a bar fight. If, however, predispositions are deterministic then this cannot be thecase. The individual did not change his level of trait aggression or the underlying predis-positions to feel angry or act angrily when provoked but, rather, they have been taughttricks or skills that allow them to adjust their behavior despite their predispositions. Thepersonality trait and predisposition are still there but the behavior changes. Personalitytraits give general tendencies toward behaviors because they are the manifestations ofpredispositions toward liking or disliking the behavior; they do not outright determine anindividual’s behavior.
Finally, I want to discuss what this dissertation says about the likelihood of preventingwarfare. On May 16, 1985, UNESCO convened an international meeting of scientists inSeville, Spain, to “refute the notion that organized human violence is biologically deter-mined.” This meeting and the statement they produced became known as the ’SevilleStatement’ (Adams, 1989). The evidence from this dissertation and from other researchsuggests that some of us may indeed have a ‘violent brain’ and that the scientists inSeville simply got it wrong. Violence, aggression, and risk-taking do seem to have astrong biological component, but that does not mean that war, rebellion or violence isunpreventable. Instead, understanding that part of the war effort is biologically drivencould help us create better-designed institutions for the “hard-to-discern progress ofpeace” (Jones, 2008, 515). In fact violence, and particularly war, are rare events which
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is what, at least partially, makes them difficult to study. Preventing or lessening theoccurrence of war through a better understanding of a predisposition towards violence,therefore, only requires that those predispositions be present in a small number of indi-viduals. In the next section, I explain the implications of this dissertation for creating andsustaining peace.
6.3 Implications for Policy Makers
6.3.1 Risk of Rebellion
Chapters 3 and 4 suggest that the individuals who participate in rebellion are differentthan those who do not, and that the participators cognate the cost and benefits of ac-tions differently. In addition, we already know that elite manipulation of existing socialcleavages can be used to create hostility and rebellion (Cunningham, Bakke, & Lee, 2011;Cunningham, 2013). What we do not know, however, is whether the individuals who par-ticipate are particularly susceptible to this elite manipulation – and if so, why. A cleareridentification and classification of the sources and expression of individual differencescan help scholars and practitioners to more properly see the ways elites manipulate thepopulace. Furthermore, it can allow for the early identification of what elite-manipulationstrategies are likely to produce rebellion, because they activate those who are likely torebel, and which strategies are likely to not. If, as is shown in Chapter 3, aggressive in-dividuals are more likely to participate in conflict then perhaps they are also more easilymanipulated by the arguments of elites.
The process of transition from protest to rebellion to civil war is well studied, but exactlywho selects into each phase of the process is not. It is entirely possible, for instance, thatelite manipulation that activates the more aggressive individuals within a society has a
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higher probability of producing conflict. In the days leading up to the Rwandan genocide,for example, we know that elites transmitted numerous stories blaming the Tutsi ethnicgroup for shooting down the plane carrying Presidents Juvenal Habyarimana and CyprienNtaryamira. If the tone and language of those transmissions activated the aggressive in-dividuals within the Hutu ethnic group more than the non-aggressive individuals, then theconflict might have been foreseen with more knowledge about the relationship betweenethnic manipulation and those who participate in conflict.
6.3.2 Targeted Reintegration Programs
While the study of rebellion and civil war has been ongoing for decades, comparativelylittle research has addressed the process of reintegrating former combatants back intosociety1 As a consequence, or perhaps the casualty is reversed, post-conflict reintegrationprograms for ex-combatants are designed and implemented in a largely ad hoc manner.Some combination of NGOs, IGOs, and state programs often work to transition peoplefrom a warlike environment to a peaceful one, but those on the ground realize that theefforts rarely operate with any overarching mandate or consistently proven design. Yet itis also true that reintegration success is crucial for sustaining peace. The programs andresearch that do exist often focuses, understandably so, on what are thought to be themost direct causes of the conflict or its most egregious outcomes.
For example, the UN demobilization process for combatants leaving the war in the Demo-cratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) usually begins with either an individual voluntarilyleaving their rebel group or with the defeat and capture of a group by the DRC armyor a UN peacekeeping force. Next, individuals enter a UN camp in Uganda, Burundi,
1For research on child solider reintegration efforts see Barnitz (1999), Machel (1996), Cohn and Goodwin-Gill (1994), Annan et al. (2011), and Blattman & Annan (2007)
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or the DRC itself. Here the ex-combatants are processed (primarily for health concerns)and identified. The combatants ants often stay at this original demobilization site foronly a few days before being sent to larger reintegration camps with more facilities andare further away from the conflict inside Uganda or Burundi. Here, ex-combatants thenenter reintegration programs that are generally focused on education efforts that instructcombatants on how to navigate daily life. Often, at this stage, the ex-combatants’ familiesare contacted and efforts to relocate them back with their relatives are common.2
In addition, efforts are often made to emphasis the cost and benefits of remaining out of arebel group and aid is provided to help ex-combatants begin their lives again. Chapter 4,however, shows that the personality traits found in DRC rebels, namely aggression, alsocorrelates with a willingness to forgo benefits in order to punish opponents. Admittedly,the stakes of the game in Chapter 4 are not even close to the cost-and-benefit calcula-tions involved in deciding whether to return to a rebel group, but they do illustrate thatreintegration programs might benefit from additional information about the personalitytypes of former combatants that would allow them to better tailor their offers, reintegra-tion, or instruction. For example, it might be better for reintegration programs to focuson the benefits of life outside of rebel groups instead of the potential cost of returning.Or it might simply be better to offer smaller but more immediate benefits instead of thepromise of larger but more distant benefits in the future.
More research is needed for a precise policy recommendation, but this dissertation doesillustrate the potential utility of that research. International donors spend hundreds ofmillions of dollars on post-conflict aid and reintegration programs. Understanding a bitmore about who that money is spent on will make it more effective and improve peace-building efforts.
2A large portion of the DRC combantants originate from Rwanda and many have family members whoremain in the country.
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6.3.3 Preventing Conflict
Taken together, Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 suggest that individuals with high levels of aggres-sion are more likely to join rebel groups and engage in violence. As suggested in Chapter1, identifying a profile of these individuals has the potential to prove beneficial to scholarsand practitioners who are interested in conflict resolution because understanding whichindividuals are likely to fight also brings greater insight into the overall rebellion process.Therefore, identifying those individuals who are likely to fight because of their particularpersonality profiles also establishes the individuals that conflict-resolution groups shouldchoose to target.
In addition, understanding which personality profiles are present in likely fighters willalso allow conflict-resolution groups the ability to more effectively tailor their programs.One good example of this type of tailor comes from a long tradition in conflict resolution,which was a recent topic in Maoz (2011). This tradition is called the “contact hypoth-esis” and was originally put forth by Allport (1954). This tradition argues that placingindividuals who are in conflict in “structured encounters” so they can interact without thepossibility of violence is an efficient way to lower levels of intergroup hostility because ithumanizes each group in the minds of the other. In addition to being a topic for academicstudy, this type of conflict resolution is commonly used in areas of ongoing or poten-tial conflict. For instance, in Israel, many individual-level conflict-resolution programs,roughly 60%, utilize some form of “structured encounter” between Arab and Jewish indi-viduals as a way of creating better interactions between the two groups. These programsoften involve young people who are likely to be the next wave of potential combatants(Maoz, 2004).
As I argue in Chapter 4, however, not all people react to an environment in the same way.In fact, previous research on aggressive individuals shows that increased contact with
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outgroups actually strengthens previously held beliefs rather than lowering them. Thisfinding is generally attributed to higher levels of cognitive dissonance in high-aggressionindividuals compared with low-aggression ones (Gubler, 2011). Knowing, from the resultsof Chapter 3, that aggressive individuals are likely to become those involved in fighting,and understanding more about how those individuals are likely to react, would clearlysuggest that preventing conflict by attempts to humanize the enemy through the contacthypothesis is not the way to lower levels of violence, but instead may increase the prob-ability of violence because the very individuals likely to fight are the same as those whohumanizing efforts negatively effect.
On the research front, the findings on the “contact hypothesis” are mixed at best. Severalstudies finding support of it (Schwarzwald, Amir, & Crain, 1992; Maoz, 2000a,b; Bargal,2004, 2008) and several note that problems exist (Suleiman, 2004a,b; Maoz, 2011). Thesemixed results can be explained by understanding two problems that arise when conflictresolution efforts are not tailored to the individuals likely to be the ones fighting. First,those individuals involved in the encounters when they are randomly selected or askedto volunteer are unlikely to be the same individuals who volunteer to join the fighting.Therefore, in a survey of participants, it is possible to get positive results on the rela-tionship between intergroup contact and attitudes toward peace and also find that thoseresults do not correspond to any observations of actual conflict. Second, if the “structuredencounter” is by design between actual combatants then, as previous research by Gubler(2011) suggests, the results are likely to be negative as contact between groups generallyproduces negative or no change in attitudes. Either way, the practice and research onthe contact hypothesis is a good example of how the work in this dissertation can beginto provide better policy prescriptions and sharpen academic theories.
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6.4 Future Directions
This dissertation has answered some questions about why some people become rebelswhile others do not and about their likely behaviors while being rebels, but it leaves manyquestions unanswered. I think of this project as the beginning of a much larger researchagenda that I, and hopefully others, will pursue for years to come. In many ways, thepreceding chapters are really a pilot study on personality and rebellion that raises manyadditional research questions and avenues of investigation. In this last section, I presenttwo distinct future projects that build off this dissertation and further validate the studyof personality and rebellion.
6.4.1 Personality and Protest
By identifying systematic differences in the personality and behavior of individuals whojoin movements, a future avenue of research will shed light onto the micro-foundationsof existing research providing new insights into how rebel groups are created and howmovements are perpetuated or resolved. One interesting way to accomplish this goal byexamining the personality traits and behavior of participants in the Arab Spring uprisingin Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Jordan and Syria. Using an open-source, academic-access fea-ture of the Twitter website, I have accessed both the individual-tweet text and physicallocation (GPS data) of participants during the political movements.
In addition to analyzing the tweet’s content, I will be using each subject’s GIS (or GPS)data to determine the amount of time each subject spent at locations where known protestand violent events were taking place. I can then cross-compare the personality measuresfor each subject to their behavior during the movement. It is expected that individualswho spent more time at protests and violent events will have systematically different per-
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sonality profiles (i.e. higher negative or aggressive word usage) than those individualswho did not participate. The project is, therefore, designed to reveal personality variationin individuals who join protest and rebel movements versus non-joiners and to show abehavioral manifestation of those differences that illustrates why those differences areimportant to the rebellion process.
6.4.2 Field Work
To test my general contention that individuals with certain psychological profiles willbe more likely join a rebel group and that those individuals will behave in systemicallydifferent ways, I plan to conduct interviews in the northern region of Uganda and easternDRC. In these regions, I can utilize the same volunteer-versus-abductee design that is de-scribed in Chapter 3 to control for the effect conflict participation has on personality traits.
The interviews will be more extensive than those used in Chapter 3 and consist of ques-tions on conflict experiences, abduction experiences, return experiences, and psychological-trait measures. In addition to aggression, I will measure threat response, risk-takingpropensity, and the Big-5 personality traits (openness, extraversion, agreeability, neu-roticism, and conscientiousness) to gain a more complete personality profile of rebel groupparticipants. In addition, I will take the game design in Chapter 4, among others, anddirectly test for cognation differences in former rebels.
My goal for the project is to interview 300-400 total subjects. Furthermore, it is not mygoal to show detailed or exhaustive information about abductees (which has already beendone by Annan et al. (2011); rather, I seek to utilize the unique sample to gain greatercausal validity for my theoretical argument.3 Moreover, this type of interview setting,
3I believe that a sample size of 300 is large enough but I am seeking more information about the
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while somewhat novel for conflict studies, is a good avenue to develop future researchideas. In addition, since part of each interview will be spent in an open format wheresubjects can talk about what they wish and because some of my questions will addresseach subject’s wartime and return experiences, new ideas and theories will emerge in-ductively from raw data which is ideal for academic research (Charmaz, 2006).
As Table 6.1 illustrates, my anticipated sample can be broken down into subsamples withconflict experience (225 total) and those with no conflict experience (75 total). This isdifferent from the analysis presented in Chapter 3 because it contains an additional sam-ple of subjects with no conflict experience. This additional sample is designed to giveme enough subjects without conflict experience to create an in-country baseline measurefor all personality-trait variables. Having this baseline will further validate the resultsin Chapter 3 as they will clearly establish the effect of conflict experience on personalitytraits.
Table 6.1: Anticipated Sample of Former Combatants: Total = 300
Conflict Experience=225 No Conflict Experience=75
Joined Voluntarily=100 Abducted=125 Baseline Controls=75
In addition, and after examining the data from Annan et al. (2011) and the interviewsfrom Blattman & Annan (2010), I anticipate there will be another subgroup division withinthose subjects who were abducted; abductees who escaped. As Table 6.2 and previouswork in the area illustrate, a large portion of individuals who were abducted eventuallyescaped. Among these individuals a small, but significant, portion report voluntarily re-turning to their rebel group. Although small, I believe this subgroup has the potential
distribution of joining behavior among the population so that I can conduct a power analysis to ensure Iinterview enough subjects.
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to be quite informative as it will allow me to further test my argument among a verysimilar group of individuals who, again, made a different choice to participate in theconflict. The numbers in Table 6.2 are estimates based on percentage of subjects whoescaped abduction reported in Annan et al. (2011) and those that reported voluntarilyreturning. If the distribution in Table 6.2 is obtainable, then I will be able to make a verypowerful comparison between the subjects who escaped but returned to the rebel groupswith those who escaped but didn’t return, alongside the larger comparison of subjectswho joined voluntarily and those who were abducted. This extraordinary sample allowsme a unique mechanism to further control for abduction experience when comparing thepersonality-trait measures, much in the same way that the larger sample controls forcombat experience.
Table 6.2: Sample of Abducted Combatants who Escaped
Escaped Abducted Subject= 75
Voluntarily Returned= 20 Didn’t Return= 55
6.5 Final Thoughts
The future projects described in the previous section are meant to build on the resultsfound within this dissertation and to extend and sharpen those findings. Indeed, thereis a lot left to understand about the role of personality in conflict and much future workis needed. This dissertation is concluding, but it is also designed to setup for the muchlarger project described in the previous section. The findings, particularly those in Chap-ters 3 and 4, will be used to justify grant applications and a book proposal for additionalresearch.
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I do, however, think the results of Chapters 3, 4 and 5, particularly those in 3 and 4,stand for themselves. Personality is an important part of why and how humans makedecisions and it is understudied in conflict research. Psychologists, biologists, and ourpolitical-behavior colleagues have long noted that psychological differences matter forunderstanding individual and group behavior, but conflict studies has been late to thegame. This dissertation, along with other emerging research, begins to reverse that pat-tern. When we put on our conflict-scholar hat, it is intuitive to explain the observation ofwar or peace through the variation on a spreadsheet containing economic, institutionalor demographic information. Yet when we take off our hat, we often intuitively explain thebehavior of our relatives and friends by recognizing patterns in their thoughts, feelings,and actions. For me, at least the time has come for those same intuitions to be appliedto conflict research.
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Appendix
Logit Model used to create the matched pairs discussed in Section 3.4.3.
Table A.1: DV = VolunteerAge .149Age Join .226Education -.256N 282Pseudo R2 0.13Note: None Significant at the 10% Level
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Appetitive Aggression Scale from Chapter 3
1. Do you like to listen to other people telling you stories of how they killed others?Explanation: You find it fascinating and exciting to listen to other people tellingyou stories of how they attacked or killed others – positive arousal.
• 0 = Not at all.
• 1 = Listens to stories of other combatants with interest but doesn’t try tomaintain the conversation.
• 2 = Enjoys to listen to other combatant’s stories but doesn’t necessarily showinterest in violent details.
• 3 = Tries to turn conversations to the time in combat, especially to the com-mitted atrocities.
• 4 = Actively encourages others to tell stories of their committed atrocities,insisting that they embellish details of violence cues when they harmed avictim.
2. Does the challenge of defeating a strong opponent make the fight more pleasurablefor you in comparison to the defeat of a weak opponent?Explanation: Emphasize the challenge.
• 0 = Not at all.
• 1 = Feels more pleasure after a fight when he fought a stronger opponent butdoesn’t actively seek out these situations.
• 2 = Feels excitement in expectations of combat situations where it will bedifficult to hunt down an opponent in a challenging fight.
• 3 = Volunteers for dangerous missions with uncertain challenges.
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• 4 = Actively seeks out only those combat situations in which the opponent isobviously stronger/heavier armed/in the majority.
3. Is it exciting for you if you make an opponent really suffer?Explanation: You feel great or you feel a kick, if you make an opponent really sufferor if you torture an opponent. Suffer = bleeding, screaming, begging for their life,etc.
• 0 = Not at all.
• 1 = Tries to distress the opponent for enjoyment but surceases them whenhe/she sees her/him begging for his/her life or suffers.
• 2 = Tries to distress the opponent for enjoyment and accepts to cause seriousharm to him/her.
• 3 = Enjoys torturing opponents.
• 4 = Can’t leave any opponent during combat without making him/her reallysuffer and spends extra time on these acts/trying to delay his/her death aslong as possible for seeing him/her suffer.
4. Do you feel powerful when you go to a fight?Explanation: Anticipation of winning.
• 0 = Not at all.
• 1 = Feels a slight increase in the confidence of victory immediately before afight that was not present beforehand.
• 2 = Feels more powerful and confident to be a strong combatant than a realisticappraisal would justify.
• 3 = Usually expects to hunt down the enemy even if he/she will be faced withsevere challenges to defeat the enemy.
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• 4 = Always expects to hunt down the enemy irrespective of the initial conditionsand even if there might be no reasonable chance to win.
5. Is it fun to prepare yourself for fighting?Explanation: Fighting includes combat, attacking civilians, going to loot or abduct.
• 0 = Not at all.
• 1 = Feels some slight excitement during preparation in anticipation of thecombat.
• 2 = Enjoys to spend some extra time to pledge himself/herself for the fight.
• 3 = Extensively celebrates the preparation for fighting beforehand, includesdressing up, preparing weapons, imaging how to fight the enemy.
• 4 = Can hardly wait to go to fight due to utter excitement during preparation.
6. During fighting does the desire to hunt or kill take control of you?
• 0 = Not at all.
• 1 = Has a slight desire to hunt down the enemy but is mainly driven by theinitial goals of the combat.
• 2 = Hunting or killing becomes the main motive during fighting even if theengagement in combat is dedicated to other motives.
• 3 = Difficult to control the urge to hunt or kill. Orders and other motivesbecome negligible.
• 4 = Can’t resist the urge to hunt down the enemy during combat and alsototally forgets about orders or the initial mission.
7. Do you enjoy inciting your fellows to fight?Explanation: Make sure that the person did not only encourage others as part ofhis job (as commander, etc.). The person encouraged others for fun (beyond duty).
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• 0 = Not at all.
• 1 = Enjoys to arouse attraction for violent behavior in his/her fellows, irrespec-tive of it will be put into action.
• 2 = Enjoys to incite other fellows that also show appetitive aggression tobehave crueler than ordered.
• 3 = Tries to incite all fellows for violent behavior irrespective of their attractionto cruelty.
• 4 = Always tries hard to incite fellows to engage with him/her in serious violentacts even if they are not motivated.
8. Is defeating the opponent more fun for you, when you see them bleed?Explanation: Emphasize that the fun comes with the blood, not with the defeat.
• 0 = Not at all.
• 1 = Gets slightly aroused when the opponent is not only defeated but alsoshows bleeding wounds.
• 2 = Usually tries to harm the opponent in a way that it is bleeding for theexperience of excitement.
• 3 = Prefers weapons that cause seriously bleeding wounds or is specificallyprepared to cause bleeding wounds.
• 4 = Enjoys to closely inspect the wounds of his/her opponents.
9. Once fighting has started, do you get carried away by the violence?Explanation: Once you have started, it is difficult to stop?
• 0 = Not at all.
• 1 = Experiences bloodlust but doesn’t put it into action.
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• 2 = Experiences bloodlust and sometimes has difficulties to stop harming anopponent.
• 3 = Gets into bloodlust. Difficult to stop harming an opponent, hardly man-ageable on his/her own.
• 4 = Gets into utter bloodlust. Fellows have to make big efforts to make themdesist from an opponent.
10. Did you harm others, just because you wanted to, without having a reason / order?
• 0 = Not at all.
• 1 = Wants to harm others but doesn’t have the heart to do so.
• 2 = Slightly overdoes orders when he/she wants to harm another person.
• 3 = Harms others beyond duty as long as these acts are to some extendconsistent with the missions goals.
• 4 = Follows a strong desire to harm others for fun in most of the cases irre-spective of any instructions/orders.
11. Once you got used to being cruel, did you want to be crueler and crueler?
• 0 = Not at all.
• 1 = Reports no general increase in the extent of cruelty, but has experiencedtimes where he/she felt a drive to act out crueler methods.
• 2 = Reports a trend for the increase of cruelty but doesn’t necessarily have tobe crueler every time.
• 3 = Reports a remarkable increase in cruel behavior to achieve the same stim-ulation. Spends time to preconceive humiliating acts.
• 4 = Reports no saturation for the urge to behave cruel even if performing utmostcruel acts.
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12. Do you know what it is like to feel the hunger/thirst to fight?Explanation: Urge/craving in your body; Do you know what it is like to feel theneed to fight? You feel this urge in your heart or soul? When you cannot fight fora week, do you feel that you have to go and fight?
• 0 = Not at all.
• 1 = Has at least a few times experienced an impulse to go to fight.
• 2 = Has a permanent subliminal desire to fight that, however, doesn’t affectdaily life.
• 3 = Has a permanent desire to fight that occasionally leads to restlessnessand the drive to act out cruel behavior.
• 4 = Experiences strong craving and symptoms like restlessness, fidgeting orsquirming when he/she hasn’t performed cruel acts for a while.
13. Is fighting the only thing you want to do in life?Explanation: Neglect of other activities in favor of fighting.
• 0 = Not at all.
• 1 = Has experienced days where he/she made the experience that fightingmight be preferable to all other activities.
• 2 = The experience that fighting is preferable to all other activities is presentthe whole day but doesn’t interfere with the interest in other activities.
• 3 = Distinctive urge to fight. Neglects other activities or interests.
• 4 = The urge to fight affects the whole day. Complete loss of interest in otheractivities.
14. Can attacking humans be sexually arousing for you?
• 0 = Not at all.
151
• 1 = Slight sexual-like arousal, not clearly identifiable as sexual.
• 2 = Experiences sexual arousal but no bodily reactions during harming a victimor imagination of how to humiliate a victim.
• 3 = Experiences sexual arousal with beginning but manageable bodily reac-tions during harming a victim or imagination of how to humiliate a victim.
• 4 = Bodily reactions like erection during harming a victim or imagination ofhow to humiliate a victim.
15. When you fight, do you stop caring about whether you could be killed?
• 0 = Not at all.
• 1 = Engages in combat actions without caring about the risk of minor healthconsequences but is aware that he/she could be at least seriously injured.
• 2 = Engages in combat actions without caring about the risk of serious healthconsequences but is aware that he/she could be killed.
• 3 = Engages in most combat actions without caring about any consequencesfor the life.
• 4 = Engages in all combat actions without caring about any consequences forthe life.
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Proactive-Reactive Aggression Scale from Chapter 4.
The Reactive–Proactive Questionnaire (RPQ). Proactive aggression items (2, 4, 6, 9, 10,12, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23) and reactive items (1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 19, 22) aresummated to form proactive and reactive scales. Proactive and reactive scale scores aresummated to obtain total aggression scores.
Instructions to Respondent There are times when most of us feel angry, or have donethings we should not have done. Rate each of the items below by putting a circle around0 (never), 1 (sometimes), or 2 (often). Do not spend a lot of time thinking about the items– just give your first response. Make sure you answer all the items (see below).
1. Yelled at others when they have annoyed you
2. Had fights with others to show who was on top
3. Reacted angrily when provoked by others
4. Taken things from other students
5. Gotten angry when frustrated
6. Vandalized something for fun
7. Had temper tantrums
8. Damaged things because you felt mad
9. Had a gang fight to be cool
10. Hurt others to win a game
11. Become angry or mad when you don’t get your way
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12. Used physical force to get others to do what you want
13. Gotten angry or mad when you lost a game
14. Gotten angry when others threatened you
15. Used force to obtain money or things from others
16. Felt better after hitting or yelling at someone
17. Threatened and bullied someone
18. Made obscene phone calls for fun
19. Hit others to defend yourself
20. Gotten others to gang up on someone else
21. Carried a weapon to use in a fight
22. Gotten angry or mad or hit others when teased
23. Yelled at others so they would do things for you
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Add Health Items Used to Create Personality Measures
• Neuroticism
– You have a lot of good qualities
– You have a lot to be proud of
– You like yourself just the way you are
– You feel like you are doing everything just about right
– You feel socially accepted
– You feel wanted and loved
• Extraversion
– I feel close to people at school
– I feel like I am a part of this school
– I feel socially accepted
• Conscientiousness
– When you have a problem to solve, one of the first things you do is get as manyfacts about the problem as possible
– When you are attempting to find a solution to a problem, you usually try tothink of as many different ways to approach the problem as possible
– When making decisions, you generally use a systematic method for judgingand comparing alternatives
– After carrying out a solution to a problem, you usually try to analyze whatwent right and what went wrong
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Add Health Items Used to Create Aggression Measure
Responses ranged from 0 (never) to 3 (five or more times).
• got into a serious physical fight
• item hurt someone badly
• used (or threatened to use) a weapon
• took part in a gang fight.
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